An analysis of Department of Defense Business Systems modernization efforts and recommendations for improving the process by Nicholas, Joseph E. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-12
An analysis of Department of Defense
Business Systems modernization efforts
and recommendations for improving the process
Nicholas, Joseph E.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9996












An Analysis of Department of Defense Business Systems Modernization 




By:      Elizabeth A. Guerra,  
    Joseph E. Nicholas, and  




Advisors: Richard L. Dawe 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
An Analysis of Department of Defense Business Systems Modernization Efforts and 
Recommendations for Improving the Process 
6. AUTHOR(S) Elizabeth A. Guerra, Joseph E. Nicholas, Corey L. Scott 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of a transformation effort under the leadership of Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  A large portion of military transformation is focused on DOD business practices.  It has been 
estimated that up to five percent of the annual DOD budget could be saved by improving and streamlining defense business 
operations.  This initiative is critical given the large numbers of legacy business systems and the steady increases in annual 
maintenance costs associated with these outdated systems.  
 This report explores the legislative history leading to the development of the Business Management Modernization 
Program (BMMP).  The current state of DOD business systems is examined, as well as case studies on specific system 
modernization initiatives conducted proceeding and immediately following the implementation of BMMP.  Our 
recommendations for successful business systems modernization efforts include senior leadership supporting the need for 
change, understanding the implications of using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products, properly structuring the acquisition 
process and emphasizing the importance of systems integration. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
111 
14. SUBJECT TERMS    Business Systems Modernization, Business Management Modernization 
Program, BMMP, Standard Procurement System, SPS, Defense Logistics Agency Business System 
Modernization, Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System, DEAMS, Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval, DAMIR, commercial off-the-shelf, COTS, 
leadership, change management, transformation, legacy systems 









































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUSINESS SYSTEMS 




 Joseph E. Nicholas, Captain, United States Air Force 
 Elizabeth A. Guerra, First Lieutenant, United States Air Force 
 Corey L. Scott, First Lieutenant, United States Air Force 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Authors:  _____________________________________ 
Joseph E. Nicholas 
 
   _____________________________________ 
Elizabeth A. Guerra 
 
   _____________________________________ 
Corey L. Scott 
 
Approved by:  _____________________________________ 
Richard L. Dawe, Lead Advisor 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   Lawrence R. Jones, Support Advisor 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   Robert N. Beck, Dean 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
AN ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUSINESS 
SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION EFFORTS AND 




The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of a transformation effort 
under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  A large portion of 
military transformation is focused on DOD business practices.  It has been estimated that 
up to five percent of the annual DOD budget could be saved by improving and 
streamlining defense business operations.  This initiative is critical given the large 
numbers of legacy business systems and the steady increases in annual maintenance costs 
associated with these outdated systems.   
This report explores the legislative history leading to the development of the 
Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP).  The current state of DOD 
business systems is examined, as well as case studies on specific system modernization 
initiatives conducted proceeding and immediately following the implementation of 
BMMP.  Our recommendations for successful business systems modernization efforts 
include senior leadership supporting the need for change, understanding the implications 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
On September 10, 2001 Secretary Rumsfeld made the following statement:1
It is not, in the end, about business practices, nor is it the goal to improve 
figures on the bottom line.  It’s about the security of the United States of 
America.  And let there be no mistake, it is a matter of life and death.  Our 
job is defending America, and if we cannot change the way we do 
business then we cannot do our job well, and we must. 
Secretary Rumsfeld is focused on transforming the way we do business in the 
Department of Defense (DOD).  He estimates that successful improvements to DOD’s 
business operations will result in an annual savings of five percent of the total DOD 
budget.  In fiscal year 2004 (FY04), this would have equated to $22 billion in savings.2  
As a result of this focus, the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) 
was instituted.  One focus of this program is modernizing business systems.  DOD 
currently relies on approximately 4150 information technology (IT) systems to support its 
business functions.  DOD requested $13 billion in fiscal year 2005 to operate, maintain, 
and modernize these systems.3  As business systems continue to age, maintenance costs 
increase.  As a result, future investments in the business system arena are expected to be 
sizeable.4  Since the IT budgets are finite, funding must be distributed between legacy 
systems, modernization efforts, and acquiring new, more efficient systems. 
The purpose for this research is to evaluate the status of business system 
modernization efforts in DOD.  With the passage of recent legislative acts, DOD’s ability 
to produce timely and accurate data necessary for effective decision making has been 
 
1 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from. 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/mission_why.html  
2 General Accounting Office. (2004). Department of defense: Further action needed to establish and implement a 
framework for successful business transformation (No. GAO-04-626T). Washington, DC: GAO. 
3 Government Accountability Office. (2005). DOD business transformation: Sustained leadership needed to 
address long-standing financial and business management problems (No. GAO-05-723T). Washington, DC: GAO. 
4 Government Accountability Office. (2004). Information technology: DOD’s acquisition policies and guidance 
need to incorporate additional best practices and controls (No. GAO-04-722). Washington, DC: GAO. 
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brought into question.  This research will examine the legislative acts dictating business 
systems reform and the current state of business systems within DOD.  Specific cases of 
business systems modernization attempts will be examined in the areas of acquisition, 
contracting, financial management, and logistics.  Testimony of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and DOD will be examined to highlight concerns DOD has 
had in the area of business systems modernization.  The research goal is to examine steps 
that have been taken to address these issues and recommend further actions necessary to 
achieve successful future business systems modernization efforts. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What areas can DOD focus on to further improve future business systems 
modernization efforts? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What is the current state of DOD business systems? 
• What legislative acts instigated business systems reform? 
• How successful has DOD been in previous business systems 
modernization efforts? 
• What new systems have been fielded after the advent of the Business 
Management Modernization Program? 
 
C. SCOPE 
This project will attempt to determine areas of improvement for business system 
modernization efforts.  This will be accomplished through the following: 
• Analyze legislative acts that were the impetus for reform 
• Review Government Accountability Office perspectives on business 
systems modernization efforts 
• Review past and current business systems modernization efforts in the 
areas of acquisition, contracting, financial management and logistics to 
evaluate areas in need for improvement and success 
• Analyze past and current business systems modernization efforts to assess 
areas in need for further improvement 
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For the purposes of our research, a business system is defined in accordance with 
10 U.S.C. 2222(i)(2), stating that a “defense business system means an information 
system, other than a national security system, operated by, for, or on behalf of the 
Department of Defense, including financial systems, mixed systems, financial data feeder 
systems, and information technology and information assurance infrastructure, used to 
support business activities such as acquisition, financial management, logistics, strategic 
planning and budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource 
management.”5
Legacy systems are defined as “those systems in existence and either deployed or 
under development at the start of a modernization program.  All legacy systems will be 
affected by modernization to a greater or lesser extent.  Some systems will become 
transition systems before they are retired.  Other systems will simply be retired as their 




This research is based on an extensive literature review including congressional 
testimonies, federal agency reports from the Government Accountability Office, Defense 
Department internal regulations, reports, policies and plans, journal articles, written text, 
and web searches.  In addition, case studies from before and after the implementation of 
BMMP will be investigated and compared to one another in order to draw meaningful 
conclusions. 
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This research paper is organized into six chapters.  Chapter II examines the 
legislative acts that acted as a catalyst for business systems modernization.  Chapter III 
 
5 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/faq_certification.html 
6Interoperability Clearinghouse Website. Glossary of terms. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.ichnet.org/glossary.htm  
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explains the current state of business systems and what efforts are being made to meet 
legislative and governmental business systems reforms.  Chapter IV is comprised of case 
studies that analyze both past and current business systems modernization efforts.  
Chapter V provides insight into areas for potential improvement based on lessons learned 
from modernization initiatives, both preceding and immediately following the Business 
Management Modernization Program.  Chapter VI summarizes the authors’ conclusions. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS REFORM ACTS AND 
PROGRAMS  
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States government has a moral responsibility to its citizens to use their 
taxes in ways that are both fair and responsible.  The financial information they use for 
decision making should be both timely and accurate.  Despite the Federal government’s 
best intentions, the best financial decisions are not always made, resulting in a negative 
impact on both the citizenry of this country and those committed to its defense.   
This section will examine the many legislative acts and programs established by 
Congress after the passage of the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, more commonly 
referred to as the CFO Act.  This act was, in our opinion, the catalyst for financial 
management system reform throughout the Department of Defense (DOD).  As a result of 
the mandates set forth in the CFO Act, other laws and acts soon followed to ensure CFO 
Act compliance, such as the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FMMIA) 
and the Clinger-Cohen Act, both passed in 1996.  The Financial Management 
Modernization Program (FMMP) followed in 2001 and evolved into what is now known 
as the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) in 2003.  Among the 
many objectives these acts and laws were designed to achieve, they each had a common 
theme: to standardize accounting, performance planning, and the use of new information 
technologies. 
 
B. CFO ACT 
1. Background 
Congress wielded its ‘power of the purse’ when it mandated financial 
management reform after several reports about fraud, waste, and abuse within the federal 
government.  Consequently, Congress demanded better accountability of where and how 
appropriated funds where being spent through the use of auditable financial statements.  
Congress’ response was to pass the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990.  At the 
time of its signing, the CFO Act was the most comprehensive financial management 
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reform within the federal government since the passage of the Budget and Accounting 
Procedures Act that created both the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), now known as the Government Accountability 
Office. 
According to the Comptroller General at the time, the passage of the CFO Act 
marked the beginning of a new era not only in federal management and accountability, 
but also in efforts to gain financial control of government operations.TP7PT 
2. Overview 
The CFO Act was designed to improve several aspects of financial management 
within the federal government.  It is designed so that managers of federal agencies and 
those that pass appropriations laws (Congress) would have more useful information to 
detect early warning signs and rectify any problems before turning into a financial crisis. 
The primary aspect of the CFO Act that garners the most attention is the 
requirement for agencies within the federal government to prepare auditable financial 
statements.  This requirement is constantly under a microscope from GAO as well as 
Congress.  In order to produce required financial statements, major changes to the way 
we manage and collect financial data had to take place.  Fifteen years after the passage of 
the CFO Act, 18 of the 24 agencies required to submit financial statements have 
produced an unqualified or “clean” audit opinion.  DOD has not yet produced unqualified 
financial statements.TP8PT   
The CFO Act included several major changes in addition to requiring financial 
statements.  First, the CFO Act created the office of an agency Chief Financial Officer to 
manage the changes mandated by the act.  An agency CFO’s duties include:  
• Develop and maintain an integrated agency accounting and financial 
management system 
• Develop agency financial management budgets 
                                                 
T7T General Accounting Office. (1991). The chief financial officers act: A mandate for federal financial 
management reform (No. GAO/AFMD-12.19.4). Washington, DC: GAO. 
T8T Office of Management and Budget Chief Financial Officers Council. (2005). Federal financial management 
report 2005. Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget. Retrieved Sept 2, 2005 from 
Hhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/financial/2005_5yr_plan.pdfH  
 7
• Submit an annual report to the Secretary of Defense with a description of 
the status of agency financial management status to include financial 
statements and audit reports.TP9PT 
Secondly, and the main focus of this research paper, is the CFO Act requirement 
to address the longstanding and serious financial management system deficiencies.  The 
CFO Act mandates that each agency Chief Financial Officer develops financial systems 
that comply with applicable accounting principles, standards, and requirements.  The 
Chief Financial Officer is also responsible for the approval and design of new financial 
systems to ensure their compliance with the CFO Act.   
To make sure that financial systems are compliant with the CFO Act, Section 302 
of the CFO Act requires that a Chief Financial Officers Council be established that 
consists of the Deputy Director of OMB, the Controller of Office of the Federal Financial 
Management of the OMB, and the Chief Financial Officers from the various agencies 
throughout DOD.  Their purpose is to discuss issues related to the consolidation and 
modernization of financial systems, improve quality of information from these systems, 
and several other financial management matters.TP10PT  
Even with Chief Financial Officers in each agency and a Chief Financial Officers 
Council, Congress felt that not enough progress was being made quickly enough.  As a 
result, the Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) was passed four years later 
followed by the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA). 
 
C. THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT ACT 
TA direct result of the CFO Act and GMRA was the Federal Financial 
Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996.  This Act was passed in response to T 
the lack of standardized, integrated financial systems mandated in earlier legislation.  The 
objective of the FFMIA is “to promote financial management systems that comply 
                                                 
T9 TGAO/AFMD-12.19.4 
T10T Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 31U.S.C. 205 (1990). Retrieved August 23, 2005, from 
Hhttp://irm.cit.nih.gov/itmra/cfoact.htmlH 
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substantially with system requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and the 
U.S. Government Standard General Ledger (SGL).”11   
The FFMIA requires that if federal agencies’ systems are found to be in non-
compliance with FFMIA standards in the course of an audit, the agency must submit a 
statement to OMB detailing what the particular agency is going to do to achieve 
regulatory compliance.  The ‘catch’, in our opinion, is that many agencies are working to 
produce compliant data from systems that are incapable of producing the required data. 
 
D. THE CLINGER-COHEN ACT 
The Information Technology (IT) Management Reform Act of 1996 (ITMRA) or 
the Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA), as it will be referred to in this and later sections, was 
passed in August of 1996.  The Act came about due to funds being spent by individual 
agencies for modernizing or improving IT systems with very little noticeable progress.  
The CCA took control of information technology (IT) out of the hands of the General 
Services Administration's (GSA's) Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation and placed 
the responsibility of IT management within individual agencies.  Like the CFO Act, the 
CCA requires that each federal agency establish a Chief Information Officer (CIO) to 
manage and oversee agency investments and improvements in IT. 
The single most important initiative of the CCA was to ensure that agencies 
stopped investing in systems that worked poorly and did not improve performance or 
work as intended.  In addition, the CCA is designed to ensure agencies take into account 
the fast paced nature of the IT industry and are always looking ahead.   
The overall response to the CCA was positive.  Organizations began to see results 
and agencies began to pay for IT systems that performed as designed.  However, there are 
still many federal agencies that are unable to achieve compliance with this legislation 
because agency financial and business systems are unreliable and antiquated.  In 
 
11 Athanasaw, D. L. (Winter 1998). Financial management reform--noble intentions, audit challenges. [Electronic 
Version]. The Armed Forces Comptroller, 43(1), 18. Retrieved August 30, 2005, from the ProQuest database. 
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response, DOD formed the Financial Management Modernization Program (FMMP) later 
changed to the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP). 
 
E. BUSINESS MANAGEMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
1. Overview 
The Financial Management Modernization Program was established to modernize 
business systems and operations.TP12PT  This is the current effort to reduce, coordinate, and 
integrate DOD new business systems development.  According to the BMMP website, 
the BMMP mission is to “transform business operations to achieve improved warfighter 
support while enabling financial accountability across the Department of Defense.”TP13PT  The 
BMMP team plans on doing this by: 
• Focusing business systems modernization on acquiring capabilities that 
will support the warfighter 
• Determining which capabilities should be common throughout DOD, and 
• Controlling investments in business systems 
 
2. Defense Business Systems Management Committee 
The FY05 National Defense Authorization Act established the Defense Business 
Systems Management Committee (DBSMC).  The DBSMC is chaired by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense and the vice chair is the Under Secretary of Defense – Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics.  Senior leaders from across DOD are also members.  This 
group serves as the highest governing body and oversees all business transformation. TP14PT  
The vision and goal of DBSMC is: 
T o advance the development of world-class business operations in 
support of the Warfighter, the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee (DBSMC) is established.  The DBSMC will recommend 
                                                 
T12T Department of Defense. (2005). Investment review process overview and concept of operations for investment 
review boards. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
T13TBusiness Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved August 23, 2005 from 
Hhttp://www.dod.mil/bmmp/index.html H 
T14T Government Accountability Office. (2005). Long-standing weaknesses in enterprise architecture development 
need to be addressed (No. GAO-05-702). Washington, DC: GAO. 
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policies and procedures required to integrate DOD business systems 
transformation and to review and approve the defense business enterprise 
architecture and cross-Department, end-to-end interoperability of 
business systems and processes, as outlined in the attached charter.TTP15PTT 
 
3. Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) 
The BEA is a representation of DOD’s current operational and technological 
environment and the desired future environment.TP16PT  The Business Enterprise Architecture 
is a guide for used by DOD to assist with business systems and processes transformation.  
The BEA links business needs to capabilities and traces strategies to systems solutions.TP17PT  
By providing one business process model DOD-wide, the BEA will achieve the 
following goalsTP18PT: 
• Enable business interoperability throughout DOD 
• Achieve operational process excellence 
• Enhance portfolio management 
The BEA will be used to guide DOD in business systems investments and ensure 
compliance with federal mandates and requirements.  According to Section 8084 of the 
DOD Appropriations Act, “an amount in excess of $1,000,000 may be obligated for a 
defense financial system improvement only if the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) makes a determination regarding that improvement."TP19PT  This will help 
ensure that investments in business systems are the most efficient and economical 
available at the time.  The BEA can also be used to increase the chances that DOD  
 
                                                 
T15T Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved August 30, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/govern_dbsmc.html 
T16T General Accounting Office. (2003). Improvements to enterprise architecture development and implementation 
efforts needed (No. GAO-03-458). Washington, DC: GAO. 
T17T Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved August 30, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp 
T18T Tibbets, P. (2004). BMMP Business Enterprise Architecture Version 2.2 Introduction and Walk-through from 
Hhttp://www.dod.mil/comptroller/bmmp/products/ Hbea_2-2_walk_thru/BEA2_2AMSession1Walk-Thru.pdf 
T19T Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics Supply Chain Systems 
Transformation Website. Portfolio management - acquistion domain policy drivers. Retrieved August, 30, 2005 from 
Hhttp://www.acq.osd.mil/scst/policy_drivers.htmH 
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investments in business systems are integrated and may also decrease the chance of 
noncompliant solutions being implemented because funding will be diverted from such 
investments.TP20PT 
The BEA will provide visibility into finance, acquisition, materiel, and personnel.  
This means that there will be access to current, accurate information DOD-wide.  Other 
capabilities that will be achieved are accountability for inventory of real property and 
common supplier engagement to take advantage of economies of scale.TP21PT   
4. Core Business Missions  
Five Core Business Missions (CBM) have been established to focus processes on 
support of the warfighter.  Certification Authorities have been appointed by the Secretary 
of Defense for each area.  The five areas (and certification authorities) are:TP22PT 
• Human Resources Management (USD(P&R)) 
• Weapon Systems Lifecycle Management (USD(AT&L)) 
• Real Property & Installation Lifecycle Management (USD(AT&L)) 
• Materiel Supply & Service Management (USD(AT&L)) 
• Financial Management (USD(C)) 
 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense and Chief Information Officer (CIO) of DOD 
are responsible for information technology infrastructure and information assurance 
activities.  All other business areas not addressed are the responsibility of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense.  Each Certification Authority must establish an Investment Review 
Board (IRB) that will provide oversight for investments in business systems.  Each IRB 
must include representatives from combatant commands, the components, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.TP 23PT 
                                                 
T20T General Accounting Office. (2004). Further actions needed to establish and implement a framework for 
successful financial and business management transformation (No. GAO-04-551T). Washington, DC: GAO. 
T21TBusiness Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved August 30, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/about_priorities.html 
T22TBusiness Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved August 30, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/about_alignment.html 
T23T Department of Defense. (2005). Investment review process overview and concept of operations for investment 
review boards. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
DOD is entrusted with the responsibility of managing and spending billions of 
taxpayer dollars each year.  With this responsibility comes scrutiny from congressional 
leadership as well as from within DOD.  An area that has received much attention from 
all levels of government is the current state of business systems and their inability to 
produce timely, accurate, and relevant financial data.  This deficiency arises from the fact 
that several systems and methods used to track financial data in DOD are antiquated.  The 
congressional response to this shortfall was a landslide of legislation throughout the 
1990s that was designed to improve financial management within DOD and other federal 
agencies. 
The legislation started with the CFO Act and its demand for auditable financial 
statements and better accounting systems.  The next major act was the Federal Financial 
Management Improvement Act.  This act mandates that each federal agency be 
accountable for their systems by reporting to DOD that they are meeting regulatory 
system requirements.  If they are found to be in noncompliance, the agency must explain 
the reason behind noncompliance as well as current agency actions directed towards 
achieving compliance.  The passage of the Clinger-Cohen Act narrowed the scope of the 
business reform legislation specifically to the management of information systems.  This 
act is designed to ensure that any new financial or other business system developed 
achieves the goals it was designed for. 
Several important changes came about from these legislative acts.  For instance, 
the creation of the Chief Financial Officer and Chief Information Officer positions 
centralized responsibility and gave ownership to the individual agency for the financial 
data and business systems within their jurisdiction.  Another change was the movement 
towards developing business systems cooperatively versus independently.  This change 
has fostered an atmosphere where federal agencies have started to look beyond their own 
organizational business systems requirements and instead look at the problem with a 
macro view in hopes of developing better integrated systems. 
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DOD has really taken the lead in transforming its business and financial systems 
with the creation of the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP).  This 
program’s mission is to, “Transform business operations to improve warfighter support 
while enabling financial accountability across the Department of Defense.”24  BMMP is a 
well designed and well intentioned program that will provide continuity among DOD 
business systems and financial operations.  DOD took the reform one step further with 
the development of the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA).  BEA will link business 
needs to capabilities and trace strategies to systems solutions. 
Although BMMP, the CFO Act, and other related financial improvement 
legislation have not completely solved all the financial management system problems, 
they have succeeded in bringing the financial reporting problems of most federal 
agencies, including DOD, to the attention of government leaders and decision makers.  
Progress will continue to be made as long as leaders throughout DOD continue to focus 
on the goal of improving the way we track and manage financial data.  The next chapter 
will discuss the current state of DOD business and financial systems and what efforts 
DOD is taking to rectify the problem.  
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III. CURRENT STATE OF DOD BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested several billions of dollars in 
financial information systems that perform many of the same functions and tasks spread 
across numerous DOD components.  In addition, many of these systems were developed 
when computer and software automation were still relatively new.  As a result, many 
systems being used today are aging and in many cases outdated.  This chapter will 
examine the current state of DOD business systems and the efforts being made to 
streamline and modernize the current financial and accounting systems to ensure 
compliance with legislative requirements.    
As a result of the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act and related legislation, the 
DOD financial management community was placed under a magnifying glass by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congress to see how quickly and where 
they could improve their operations to meet the new standards and objectives of these 
laws.  One area in particular that has been repeatedly scrutinized by GAO, Congress, the 
Secretary of Defense, and other DOD leaders is the current status of the finance and 
accounting systems used within DOD to track and account where and how efficiently 
taxpayer dollars are being spent.   
As a result of the scrutiny and a perceived lack of progress being made in the area 
of financial management transformation, GAO placed DOD business systems 
modernization and financial management on its list of high-risk areas in the federal 
government.25  Ten years later, financial management and business systems 
modernization still holds a spot on the list.  
What is the current state of affairs concerning business systems?  How did DOD 
get to the point where the organization recognized that a problem existed?  These 
questions will be examined in the next section. 
 
25 Walker, D. (2005). Comptroller General’s remarks to the senate centrist coalition. Washington, DC: GAO. 
Retrieved August 5, 2005 from http://www.gao.gov/cghome/centristsenate20050201/img0.html. 
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B. PROBLEM 
The financial responsibility entrusted to DOD by taxpayers, Congress, etc., is 
immense.  With annual budgets in the hundreds of billions of dollars, it is imperative that 
taxpayers be assured that tax dollars are being used and accounted for as efficiently and 
prudently as possible.  The problem is that DOD business systems, finance systems in 
particular, are antiquated, stovepiped, redundant and not properly integrated, costing U.S. 
taxpayers billions of dollars annually due to these inefficiencies.26  Consequently, several 
billions of dollars each year are spent on the operations and maintenance of these 
outdated systems and in modifications to produce better financial data and 
accountability.27
In 2005, DOD requested approximately $13 billion to operate and maintain 
business systems.  Of this amount, only $2.6 billion or 20 percent of the information 
technology budget will be spent modernizing the current inventory of business and 
financial systems.  Table 1 shows the breakdown of agency spending plans for 
modernization and operations and maintenance of their current business systems 
inventory in 2005. 
Based on GAO reports and the critical press that DOD has received as a direct 
result of its antiquated systems, it appears that a disproportional amount of funding is 
spent on systems maintenance when the focus should be on the modernization or 
replacement of these old systems.  Granted, not all the funding listed in Table 1 is 
designated for financial management systems, but illustrates that the longstanding 







26 Government Accountability Office. (2005). DOD business systems modernization: Billions being invested 




Table 1.   Distribution of DOD’s $13.3 Billion IT Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2005 for 
Business Systems and Related Infrastructure28 
Dollars in 
Millions 





Navy $3,278 $206 $3,484
Air Force $2,630 $726 $3,356





DLA $602 $179 $781








TOTAL $10,731 $2,632 $13,363
 
There are several documented instances where DOD has failed to meet the needs 
of those it serves as a direct result of its poor financial systems.  The following examples 
help to illustrate the problems associated with the financial systems.  One recent GAO 
study reported, “Four hundred and fifty of the 481 mobilized Army National Guard 
soldiers from six Special Forces and Military Police units had at least one pay problem 
associated with their mobilization.  DOD’s inability to provide timely and accurate 
payments to these soldiers, many of whom risked their lives in recent Iraq or Afghanistan 
                                                 
28 GAO-05-723T 
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missions, distracted them from their missions, imposed financial hardships on the soldiers 
and their families, and has had a negative impact on retention.”29
Another GAO report found that during a 12-month period, a Special Forces 
soldier fell out of active duty status four times while attempting to receive medical care 
following a helicopter crash in Afghanistan.  While not listed as active duty during the 
times he was dropped from the system, he was not paid and his family endured delays in 
receiving needed medical care.  Ultimately, this particular soldier missed ten pay periods 
totaling $11,924.30
Problems like this and countless others often occur because many of the systems 
still require that data be manually input into the system and these legacy systems often do 
not communicate effectively or at all with each other.  Many lines of accounting can 
include up to 48 digits that can be easily transposed or “fat-fingered.”  The GAO findings 
cited previously were most likely only a fraction of the service members (active duty and 
reserve components) that have been affected by the antiquity of financial systems used 
today.  Efforts have been made to make data transfer easier between systems by utilizing  
crosswalks and data translators31; however, these attempts have not been completely 
successful and the most common result is manual data entry of required data. 
Although very important, pay issues are not the only problems resulting from the 
antiquity of current legacy systems.  Commanders and managers at all levels are not 
always provided with the most accurate and current financial data needed to make 
decisions.  Due to the age of the systems and their lack of integration and standardization, 
data must often be moved via manual input from one system to another until it finally 
generates a single report in the desired format.  This inefficiency alone wastes not only 
time and money, but also puts other DOD programs at risk when major financial 




31 Specialized lines of code that enable different computer systems to communicate. 
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Another major problem affecting the financial systems in DOD is the sheer 
number of systems in use.  Ironically, the number of reported business systems within 
DOD continues to increase, when the objective is to reduce and streamline the number of 
active systems.  In 2002, the number of business systems reported was 1,731; in 2003 it 
was 2,300.  In 2004, there was a slight decrease in the number of reported business 
systems to 2,274.  The last DOD estimate in 2005 reported that there were 4,150 business 
systems.  Of that number, 600 systems are classified as financial management systems.32  
Table 2 depicts the financial systems by component.   
 
Table 2.   Reported DOD Business Systems by Financial Domain and Component33 












41 88 233 93 59 15 71 600 
 
In addition, many of the reported systems in each component perform duplicative 
processes.  For example, the Air Force budget community uses two major budgeting 
systems: Micro-based Budget Automated System (MICROBAS) and Commanders 
Resource Information System (CRIS).  Both of these systems use and produce essentially 
the same reports and data in slightly different formats.  CRIS was billed as the future of 
budgeting software in the Air Force, yet they still continue to support and use 
MICROBAS years after it was supposed to have “gone away.” 
Many business and financial systems are stovepiped, meaning they have a single 
focus and were not designed to promote information sharing between systems.  It may 
take multiple systems sending the same data to each other to produce a single report 
instead of having one system track and generate the needed results.  Data must often be 




                                                
transferred multiple times between systems.  Information must pass through several tiers 
of systems to generate a single reliable output. 
Another important point is the fact that the number of DOD business systems is 
only an estimate.  Nobody is absolutely certain how many financial systems are in use 
throughout DOD.  In addition to the number of known systems, there are most likely 
countless other “unknown” financial systems that have been developed at the major 
command level, base level organization, or other federal agencies as a work around to the 
duplicative nature of current financial management systems.  These undocumented 
systems are not included in Table 1 and do not receive direct information technology 
funding from DOD.  Often, the only funding these systems might receive is at the local 
level and maintenance is accomplished on service members’ personal time with no direct 
or documented expense to DOD.   
 
C. LACK OF STANDARDIZATION 
A major issue which is constantly documented in GAO reports, congressional 
hearings, service component discussions, etc., is the lack of data standardization among 
the many current DOD finance systems.  It is important to remember that each service 
has developed its own systems in their own bureaucratic organizational structure.   
For example, the Air Force has always focused on using the latest and greatest 
technology.  As a service, they tend to be more receptive and adaptable to accepting and 
pushing for newer and more efficient ways of conducting business.  The Air Force has 
become more corporate in its adoption of efficiency and effectiveness ideals.  On the 
other end of the spectrum is the United States Navy, the service that is more than 
anything an institution.  They are very sure of their independence and stature within the 
DOD and the United States.  For this reason, they tend to hold fast to traditions and 
ideals.  They know better than anybody else what is best for the Navy.  This might 
explain why in Table 2 the Navy has so many more systems than the other services.34
 
34 Builder, C. H. (1989). The masks of war: American military styles in strategy and analysis. Maryland: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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This is the reason that for many years, each service acted independently and 
developed finance systems that helped each service to accomplish its particular mission 
and fit with how they identified themselves within the DOD.  In the early 1980’s, a major 
drive was made in DOD to create more of a joint focus.  With the focus on joint 
initiatives and the increase in interactions between the services, the lack of financial 
system standardization and the data contained therein came to light.  As a result, there is 
an inability for many systems across DOD to communicate effectively with each other. 
Across DOD, there are numerous financial systems that perform very similar 
tasks.  There are systems that are known by different names yet they still perform parallel 
tasks and generate identical reports.  As a result, DOD spends countless hours generating 
and evaluating redundant, complex data that may or may not be useful and leads to 
inefficiencies and lower overall effectiveness. 
A problem faced in gaining better standardization is the fact that financial 
management systems are intertwined with a multitude of other support systems ranging 
from logistics, transportation, supply, maintenance, personnel, contracting, acquisition 
and a host of other non-financial systems.  To make broad brush standardization 
decisions concerning financial management systems would certainly have unintended 
consequences for other systems.   
In response to the lack of financial system standardization, The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) issued OMB Circular A-127.  This circular lays out in 
detail the financial system requirements that should exist within DOD and prescribes 
policies and standards for federal agencies to follow in developing, operating, evaluating, 
and reporting on financial systems. 
It states that, “The federal government's financial management system policy is to 
establish government-wide financial systems and compatible agency systems, with 
standardized information and electronic data exchange between central management 
agency and individual operating agency systems.”  It also states that, “… any financial 
system developed should provide complete, reliable, on-time, and useful financial 
management data to better enable central management agencies, individual operating 
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agencies, divisions, bureaus and other subunits to carry out their fiduciary 
responsibilities.  Further, the systems should be developed in such a way as to prevent 
and deter fraud, waste, and abuse of resources.” 
An important outcome of this circular is that it provides a definition of what a 
“financial system” is comprised of, and what it is used for.  The definition of a “financial 
system” as defined by OMB is an information system, comprised of one or more 
applications, that is used for any of the following:  
• collecting, processing, maintaining, transmitting, and reporting data about 
financial events 
• supporting financial planning or budgeting activities  
• accumulating and reporting cost information 
• supporting the preparation of financial statements  
Additionally, OMB A-127 states that each service or federal agency is required to 
institute and sustain a single integrated (emphasis added) financial management system.  
With a single integrated system, the plan is that the services and other federal agencies 
will be better prepared and able to meet the standards laid out in the objectives described 
above.  In addition to a single integrated system, each agency must also ensure that their 
financial systems are reviewed regularly for compliance and that it meets all established 
system capabilities.P35  
 
D. FEEDER SYSTEMS 
The problem does not just lie with DOD financial management systems.  
Although, the greater part of financial systems “ownership” belongs to the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the majority of the data fed into their financial 
systems comes from feeder systems, or external systems, to DFAS.  These external feeder 
systems originate within the four military branches of the armed forces or within other 
federal agencies.  Several independent analyses show that upwards of 80 percent of the 
                                                 
35 Office of Management and Budget. Circular A-12: Financial management systems. Washington, DC: Office of 
Management and Budget. 
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data fed into DFAS accounting systems originates in non-DFAS systems.36  As a result, 
the data fed from theses numerous external systems is only as dependable as the system 
that is feeding the information. 
In the DOD report Biennial Financial Management Improvement Plan, DOD 
listed inadequate program feeder systems as one of its four roadblocks.  They found that 
the majority of feeder systems do not integrate electronically with DFAS systems.  As a 
result, this data must be sent by hard copy to DFAS to be manually fed into DFAS 
financial systems.  The report also documented the fact that many of these feeder systems 
were created long before recent legislative acts were passed such as the Clinger-Cohen 
Act or the CFO Act, and have not been upgraded for compliance with these laws.   
Despite receiving more than 80 percent of its data from agency systems and the 
military services and DFAS’ lack of control over these systems, DFAS chose not to sit 
idly by.  They have aggressively attacked the integration problem head on, although with 
limited success. 
 
E. THE DFAS RESPONSE 
According to the Annual Defense Review of 2000, DFAS reported as many as 
324 accounting and finance systems in 1991.  In 1999, the number of systems had been 
reduced to 98.  Of the 98 systems, 15 are finance-related systems and the remainder are 
accounting based systems.37  Despite these reductions that DFAS is to be commended for, 
they still have issues with integration and standardization of related data. 
DFAS attempted to remedy the problem with feeder systems with the creation of 
a data warehouse called the DFAS Corporate Database/DFAS Corporate Warehouse 
(DCD/DCW).  It was designed to be the DFAS database containing all financial data.   
 
 
36 Thomas, G. (1999). DOD’s critical feeder systems: Achieving compliance with the federal financial 
management improvement act of 1996. [Electronic Version]. The Armed Forces Comptroller, 44(1), 15. Retrieved 
August 17, 2005, from the ProQuest database. 
37 Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2000). Annual defense review 2000. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense. 
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The system was designed to collect the data and then disburse it within DFAS as needed.  
This program was designed to be the single point of collection for all the financial data 
from the various feeder systems.  
In order for DCD/DCW to accept data from the various feeder systems, DFAS 
initially chose to use crosswalks to standardize the information coming into the 
database.38  This idea was abandoned after DFAS realized that the programming involved 
to make crosswalks for all feeder systems was unreasonably inefficient and that the costs 
to achieve such a goal would be prohibitive.  The cost of the crosswalks was estimated at 
$42 million, which represented 20 percent of the $209 million development cost of the 
DCD/DCW system.39   
Another concern that arises with feeder systems is that as DFAS works diligently 
to rectify the problem with gathering and translating data, the organizations feeding the 
data to DFAS are spending time and money updating their systems with little or no 
coordination between the two.  Consequently, neither side can give any sort of guarantee 
that the financial systems being developed and implemented will function as a single 
integrated financial management system.  Lack of coordination and teamwork in 
developing integrated software solutions only exacerbates the issue and prolongs both 
DFAS’ and the federal agencies’ ability to produce accurate and meaningful data without 
resulting to arcane techniques like manual data entry.   
To further illustrate the point, in a DOD Inspector General Report they found that 
several federal agencies had multi-million dollar financial systems that could not work 
with DCD/DCW.  For example, the Defense Logistics Agency had a $1 billion supply 
chain management system that could not work with DCD/DCW; both the Army and 




38 Crosswalks translate information so that systems with different formats can communicate and share 
information.  
39 Office of the Inspector General Department of Defense. (2001). Development of the defense finance and 
accounting service corporate database and other financial management systems No. D-2002-014). Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. 
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DCD/DCW.  DFAS even suggested that the Air Force develop a program specifically for 
their financial management system needs with a price tag of $16 million instead of being 
integrated into DCD/DCW.40   
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There is a serious problem throughout DOD when it comes to the business and 
financial systems currently in use.  Some of the problems are a lack of standardization, 
stovepiped systems, inefficiency due to manual data entry and redundant processes.  They 
are also antiquated in their computer programming languages as well as in their ability to 
meet the needs of a twenty-first century military organization.  With the passage of the 
legislative acts discussed in the last chapter, it has become imperative to address these 
longstanding problems.  These legacy systems end up costing DOD millions of dollars 
annually to maintain.  It is estimated by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that modernizing 
the business and financial systems now in use could have saved DOD an estimated $22 
billion in fiscal year 2004, money that could have been spent in direct support of the 
warfighter. 
Furthermore, DOD is not exactly sure how many business systems are currently 
in use.  The reported number of systems continues to rise even as DOD works desperately 
along with other federal agencies to reduce the number of systems in use.  Attempts have 
been made by organizations such as DFAS that have been well intentioned, but were 
abandoned because of cost overruns and poor oversight of the programs.   
At some point, the lack of coordination and seemingly endless spending with very 
little real progress has to stop.  DOD is wasting significant resources on financial systems 
that appear to have left us where we started.  There has been progress made but nothing 
significant.  As a result, DOD continues to leave itself open to potential financial fraud 
and poor data with which major financial decisions are made.  If the objective is to 
streamline the number of business systems in use within DOD and other federal agencies, 
then major changes must be made. 
 
40 General Accounting Office. (2003). DOD business systems modernization: Continued investment in key 
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IV.  CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine specific business systems modernization efforts from 
the acquisition, contracting, financial management, and logistics communities within the 
Department of Defense (DOD).  Two of the systems examined, the Standard Procurement 
System (SPS) and the Defense Logistics Agency Business System Modernization, were 
implemented prior to the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP).  The 
other two systems, Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) 
and Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR), were 
implemented after the Business Management Modernization Program was employed.  
The case studies explore the methods used to develop and deploy the systems and analyze 
the problems encountered during the process.  Furthermore, the case studies discuss the 
associated costs and savings associated with each system.  Ultimately these cases will be 
used to develop lessons learned and will be presented in Chapter V as recommendations. 
 
B. STANDARD PROCUREMENT SYSTEM (SPS) 
1. Background 
The Standard Procurement System (SPS) is a major acquisition program 
responsible for developing, testing, and deploying a software suite that automates and 
standardizes the procurement process throughout the entire Department of Defense 
(DOD).41  The experiences and lessons learned from SPS are particularly relevant to the 
Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP), since SPS is the first and only 
DOD-wide business system ever deployed.42   
The idea behind SPS dates back to 1994, although the impetus for SPS occurred a 
few years earlier.  The driving forces behind SPS were the Chief Financial Officers 
 
41 Standard Procurement System Website. Program overview. Retrieved August 9, 2005 from 
www.spscoe.sps.eis.army.mil/program history.htm
42 Cahlink, G. (2003). Standard procurement system. [Electronic Version]. Government Executive, 35(17), 76. 
Retrieved August 9, 2005, from the ProQuest database. 
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(CFO) Act of 1990 and the state of automated contract systems at that time.  The CFO 
Act stressed the need for better accountability of total dollars spent by DOD.43  
Accountability was extremely difficult with over 70 separate contract systems lacking 
connectivity and standard data protocols.  These legacy systems were also suffering from 
high maintenance costs and general obsolescence.  SPS was to replace these legacy 
systems with one new system to be deployed throughout DOD, resulting in life cycle cost 
savings over the legacy systems in areas such as personnel training and process 
accountability.44
2. Methodology 
SPS called for the replacement of over 70 contract-writing legacy systems.  An 
evolutionary approach, incorporating spiral development, would be used for the 
program.45  Spiral development involves the use of current technology to provide an 
operational system, while continually evolving and adding capabilities as advanced 
technology becomes available.  SPS employs spiral development through the use of 
software versions.  Each new software version or release of SPS incorporates more 
advanced features and offers improved capabilities for procurement personnel.   
The acquisition strategy for SPS called for the use of commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) software.  Acquisition reform in the mid-1990’s, in the form of the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
(FARA) of 1996, called for greater use of commercial business practices, as well as 
structuring requirements to incorporate greater use of commercial goods and services.  A 
competitive source selection took place among DynCorp and American Management 
Systems (AMS) in 1996.  Both contractors were awarded seven month demonstration 
contracts prior to selection of one contractor.  In April 1997, AMS was awarded a $240 
million, 10-year contract for Procurement Desktop-Defense (PD2), the software package 
 
43 Lawlor, M. (2001). Military marches toward harmonized acquisition processes. [Electronic Version]. Signal, 
55(10), 41. Retrieved August 9, 2005, from the ProQuest database. 




                                                
for SPS.46  PD2 is a heavily modified version of Procurement Desktop, an existing 
commercial procurement software application.  The use of modified COTS software 
would have serious ramifications for DOD later on in the contract. 
Initial deployment of SPS occurred in strategically planned stages.  Initial system 
deployment was planned for sites without large legacy systems currently in place.  This 
helped to provide SPS with potentially higher payback and lower levels of complexity for 
system installation.47  Initial installation began in 1997 with a total of 3,812 users.  User 
totals grew to 16,000 users in 1999 and 20,894 users in 2000.  Installation was originally 
projected for completion by October 2003, resulting in 43,000 users at 1,100 sites.48  As 
of June 15, 2005, there are only 23,000 users in over 800 locations.49
3. Problems/Issues 
As the pioneer DOD-wide business system, SPS has had its share of problems.  
Deployment of the system has fallen significantly behind schedule.  The original DOD 
estimates of three to five years for full system deployment were overly optimistic.50  SPS 
was originally slated for full deployment by March 31, 2000.  This schedule has 
continuously slipped due to software glitches, difficulty switching over from legacy 
systems and late software releases.  Problems with fielded software were so numerous 
that DOD halted further development of future versions of SPS in 2002 in order to force 
AMS to fix the fielded version.51  Slightly over half of the total anticipated users and 
approximately two thirds of the total locations employed SPS as of June 15, 2005.   
Software problems have contributed to greater user resistance to SPS.  Every 
large bureaucracy has a natural tendency to resist change.  The amount of resistance is 
 
46 Lawlor 
47 Moore, J. (1997). AMS wins DOD-wide, $238M pact. Federal Computer Week, 11(10). Retrieved August 9, 
2005, from http://www.fcw.com/article64655-04-13-97-Print
48 Lawlor 
49 Standard Procurement System Website. Program overview. Retrieved August 9, 2005 from 
www.spscoe.sps.eis.army.mil/program history.htm
50 Moore, J. (1997). DOD inches toward $1B SPS contract. Federal Computer Week, 11(9). Retrieved August 9, 
2005, from http://www.fcw.com/article64627-03-30-97-Print
51 Dorobek, C. J. (2002). Defense halts procurement system. [Electronic version]. Federal Computer Week, 16(4). 
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typically in direct proportion to the amount of change anticipated.  This DOD-wide 
system change would meet substantial amounts of resistance.  Many procurement 
professionals were used to working with automated systems specifically tailored to their 
Department’s need, be it Army, Navy or Air Force.  The new system threatened to 
eliminate the advantages of the custom-tailored systems currently in use and offer a 
replacement system that, while meeting everyone’s minimum needs, performed day-to-
day contracting functions less efficiently and effectively.  The incremental approach 
taken by SPS actually increased user resistance, with many offices using slightly different 
software versions.52
The use of a modified COTS software package has also caused significant 
problems.  Extensive modifications were made to the commercial application of 
Procurement Desktop.  These modifications have resulted in a product costing much 
more than the original commercial application and caused the software to be less reliable 
and more vulnerable to system failures.  By purchasing a modified COTS software 
application, DOD did not receive the rights to modify and maintain the software.  The 
current terms and conditions of the contract do not allow DOD or another contractor to 
use any ideas or templates from SPS in order to design a new system.53  This creates a 
long-term sole source requirement.  As long as DOD intends to use SPS, AMS is the only 
company authorized to modify, maintain, and update the system.  When the time comes 
for DOD to re-compete the requirement for SPS, an entirely new software system, with 
templates and designs distinct from the existing AMS system, must be designed, unless 
AMS receives the new contract award.  This problem could have been avoided by 
adequate acquisition planning that recognized the need to negotiate additional software 






53 Verton, D. (1999). Report: Flawed acquisition strategy derails DOD’s procurement system. Federal Computer 
Week. Retrieved August 9, 2005, from http://www.fcw.com/article69159-05-27-99-Print
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4. System Reduction Metrics 
SPS has fallen well short of the original system reduction goals it promised.  SPS 
was originally slated to replace 76 procurement legacy systems..  The original figure for 
procurement legacy systems was overstated.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
determined from the results of a survey conducted in 2001 that the actual number of 
existing legacy procurement systems was 55.54   
Not only was the amount of existing legacy systems for procurement overstated, 
not all of the systems were to be replaced by SPS.  Officials in the SPS program office 
had varying responses to the amount of systems SPS was due to replace.  The number of 
procurement systems destined for replacement ranges between 10 and 12.  One individual 
from the program office even made the comment that SPS was always intended to replace 
only 14 major procurement legacy systems.55   See Table 3 for more detailed system 
status information.  This information has serious ramifications on the value of SPS to 
DOD and will be further discussed in the cost vs. savings section of this case study. 
 
Table 3.   Status of Legacy Contracting Systems as of June 2001 
Status Number of systems 
Retired as a result of SPS implementation 2 
Retired for reasons other than SPS implementation 4 
Will not be retired 2 
Retirement dependent on implementation of a system other than SPS 2 
Remaining legacy contracting systems 45 
Total 55 




                                                 
54 General Accounting Office. (2001). DOD systems modernization: Continued investment in the standard 
procurement system has not been justified (No. GAO-01-682). Washington, DC: GAO. 
55 GAO-01-682 
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5. GAO/DOD View on Progress 
SPS has not received many positive reviews since its implementation.  DOD has 
continued to support SPS despite a myriad of user complaints and heavy criticism from 
GAO.  DOD still maintains the position that SPS warrants continued investment and the 
benefits from implementing SPS across DOD will outweigh the total cost of the system.   
GAO has expressed heavy criticism of SPS.  These criticisms have ranged from 
program management issues to system implementation procedures.  GAO has raised 
concerns over poorly defined user requirements for SPS software, overly optimistic 
implementation schedules, lack of overall system expenditure tracking, and progress 
against initial program goals.   
The most serious criticisms are the lack of total expenditure data and lack of 
progress checks against program goals.  The SPS program office only tracks expenditures 
for SPS made by their office.56  The program office does not have a mechanism to track 
all costs related to the system, such as user training and system operation and 
maintenance costs incurred at the unit level.  The program office needs to know the full 
costs for SPS implementation and operation in order to make informed decisions on 
future investment. 
DOD continues to support SPS despite the system falling short on key program 
goals.  Full system implementation was originally scheduled to occur by March 31, 2000.  
Once this date was reached, a new milestone for system implementation date of 
September 30, 2003, was established.  An extension of three and a half years proved 
insufficient.  As of July 2005, full system implementation has still not occurred. 
Another key goal of SPS was the use of COTS software.  In order to meet DOD 
needs, the software had to be heavily modified, resulting in a DOD-unique system.  The 
benefits of acquiring COTS were not realized and actually created more problems.  The 
biggest issue concerns software data rights.  If SPS had been acquired as a non-
commercial item, all source code and data rights would be owned by the government.  




                                                
reliance on the original software development company.  Since SPS was purchased as a 
commercial item, the government does not automatically assume source code and data 
rights to the software.  Any modifications, maintenance, and upgrades under the current 
contract must be made by AMS.  This creates an undesirable sole source environment 
that the government must now deal with for SPS. 
6. Costs and Savings of System Reduction Efforts 
Initial life cycle cost estimates for SPS were $2.9 billion in 1997.  By 2000, this 
figure had increased to $3.7 billion.57  This represents a 28 percent increase in only three 
years.  These figures are almost meaningless due to one factor.  DOD does not have a 
single agency responsible for accumulating the full DOD costs of SPS.  DOD will always 
lack accurate total cost data to compare against the estimates, making the estimates 
useless.   
Savings associated with the replacement of legacy systems have been just as 
nebulous.  Estimated benefits in 2000 amounted to $1.4 billion.  This number is probably 
inflated due to high number of legacy systems that were initially planned to be replaced 
by SPS.  System replacement figures have dropped from 76 to 14.  This is a significant 
drop in systems to be replaced.  DOD cost benefit analyses have not taken this factor into 
consideration, since it will further hurt the case for supporting SPS. 
 
C. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
MODERNIZATION 
1. Introduction 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) equips our military and other civilian 
agencies with resources that are vital to their ability to complete their missions.  They 
provide food, fuel, clothing, vehicles, and other consumable items to all the services and 







                                                
when necessary.  There are continuous efforts within DLA to continue to streamline its 
supply depot and distribution systems so that items can be delivered to the warfighter 
when they are needed.58
DLA’s business systems have been using 1960’s technology for the last 30 years.  
The agency uses four major legacy systems that are not well integrated and the systems 
maintain separate financial and physical management information, as shown in Table 4.  
The systems are slow, requests take a long time to process, and users do not have access 
to current information.  This resulted in the agency warehousing large amounts of 
supplies to reduce the time necessary to get the supplies, but also increasing the holding 
costs of inventory.  The systems had no collaborative planning capabilities, so DLA was 
unable to synchronize its supply chain and could not cooperate with its suppliers to plan 
production and delivery schedules.59  DLA customers knew that the agency took a long 
time to respond to their requests, so they bought supplies on their own, foregoing the cost 
savings received from volume discounts or long-term relationships.60   
The systems were not well integrated, resulting in redundant functions between 
the field offices and headquarters, see Table 4.  Much time was spent reentering 
information that could have been automatically entered if the systems were better 
integrated.  Although the systems have been updated over the years, these upgrades were 
not able to keep up with the new technology available and the changing business 





58 Global Security Website. Defense logistics agency. Retrieved August 26, 2005 from 
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59 Ackerman, R. K. (2004). Defense logistics modernizes commercially. [Electronic Version]. Signal, 58(5), 33. 
Retrieved September 1, 2005. 
60 Greenmeier, L. (2005). Defense agency updates systems. [Electronic Version]. InformationWeek, (1031), 51. 
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2. Methodology – Reengineering or Reinvention 
DLA has decided to replace the existing legacy systems using a phased approach 
to introducing new systems.  They are currently attempting to replace two legacy material 
management systems, Standard Automated Materiel Management System (SAMMS) and 
Defense Integrated Subsistence Management System (DISMS) with an existing 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system.  The 
remaining legacy systems are scheduled to be replaced by 2007.  They have established 
an ACAT I program to monitor the implementation.63  Establishing a major program 
means that their will be more oversight and progress will be carefully monitored by GAO 
and other agencies.  Not only are they replacing all the existing systems, but they are also 
reducing the number of systems that they use.  In addition, the program will be web-
based to allow faster, simpler access to more users. 
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62 General Accounting Office. (2001). Information technology: DLA should strengthen business systems 
modernization architecture and investment activities (No. GAO-01-631). Washington, DC: GAO. 
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3. Problems/Issues 
The only problems forecasted by DLA are process changes and cultural changes.64  
DLA has instituted a new program called Knowledge Transfer and Training to address 
the required changes.  This team of individuals is responsible for developing training 
materials, skilled instructors, and effective delivery methods to impart the knowledge and 
habits necessary to make these changes.  There is also an online toolkit that DLA 
personnel can access at any time to get advice on how to approach a situation or resolve 
issues.65  DLA employees will have new processes to follow and will have to change their 
way of thinking to utilize the new capabilities that allow better cooperation with 
suppliers.  They will have to think more about long term ordering instead of short term, 
one time orders.  Once this has become the normal way of doing business, the problems 
associated with it should fade away.  Employees will have to use the new system which 
has a different interface, but this will actually make training easier because it utilize a 
Windows-based system with a point and click interface that most people are comfortable 
using.  While it may take a while for people who have been using the previous system for 
a long time to adjust, the transition should be easy since most people are familiar with 
that type of interface. 
4. Areas of Success /Accomplishments 
The first release of the new system was implemented in 2002.  It was basically to 
demonstrate that the use of the COTS system was possible and that it can handle the 
requirements.  The ERP system has been used for processing orders for a certain set of 
items and has been extremely successful.66  Over the next few years the ERP system will 
incorporate all items to achieve full capability and phase out existing legacy systems.  So 
far, DLA has experienced reduced operating costs, enhanced supply availability of the 
 
64 Ackerman 
65 Defense Logistics Agency. (2003). Release two design phase kicks off. The "One DLA" Connection, 9, 




                                                
items being tracked with the new system, and a reduction of the number of items on 
backorder.67  The program is currently on schedule and has not had any major issues.68
5. GAO/DOD View on Progress 
One issue that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has had with DLA’s 
BSM is the lack of compatibility with DOD’s overarching Business Enterprise 
Architecture (BEA).69  In 2001, GAO commented on the fact that DLA was managing the 
BSM program without an enterprise architecture.  A BEA is important because, as 
discussed in the previous chapters, it creates the roadmap to move from the current state 
to the desired state of business systems.  Without a plan for integrating the systems, there 
is little chance of successful execution, due to unforeseen issues arising and no plan of 
action to mitigate risk.  DOD concurred with this recommendation and DLA recognized 
the need for an enterprise architecture and proceeded to develop and implement one.70  
Since the emergence of BMMP and the BEA, there have been complaints that the DLA 
architecture is not compatible with the BEA.  DLA refutes this argument and claims that 
the architecture being used will easily fit within the overarching BEA.71  It has yet to be 
seen which argument is correct as only the initial release has been implemented.  Since it 
was a concept demonstration program, the system has not been incorporated into the 
overarching BEA. 
GAO also commented on the fact that DLA was not investing incrementally in 
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acknowledged that DLA plans to acquire and implement the new systems in an 
incremental manner, so this potential issue should be resolved once DLA follows its 
incremental plan. 
6. Future Developments 
The new system will ultimately track over four million items and over 30 million 
actions will be processed per year.  This will assist managers in making decisions and 
managing the resources available.  According to the Joint Interoperability Test 
Command, “BSM will support the users in all aspects of their logistics mission to include 
demand planning, supply planning, item cataloging, procurement, contracting, order 
management, and financing.”73  The current plan is to have the four major legacy systems 
replaced by 2007. 
7. Costs and Savings of System Reduction Efforts 
Cost estimates for the new DLA system range from $700M to $751M.74  There are 
no other non-monetary costs projected except the process and cultural changes already 
mentioned.  There is little data available addressing the scale of and monetary value 
associated with these culture changes, but DLA has taken steps, such as the training 
mentioned previously, to address these issues. 
The projected cost savings and cost avoidance do not have monetary values 
associated with them that we could find, but do improve operations and will undoubtedly 
assist in reducing costs for DLA.  First of all, the use of a Windows-based, point and 
click system should reduce the time needed to train personnel on the new system.  This 
kind of interface is well known and personnel should quickly understand how to use the 
system.  Over time this will substantially reduce the costs associated with training by 
reducing the time needed to conduct training in person or classroom settings.  Also, the 




73 Joint Interoperability Test Command Website. (2005). JITC OT&E defense logistics agency support. Retrieved 
August 30, 2005 from http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/ot&e/dla.htm
74 Greenmeier and Optimal Corporation 
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training by giving people access to an online site that does not have to be constantly 
monitored by a human.  This will reduce the salaries associated with the personnel used 
for training or telephone support. 
This will not only reduce the training time, but will also increase the speed in 
which DLA can respond to customers’ needs.  Customers will be able to search for items 
online and also place orders online.  The web-based system will provide automated 
information about each product, so customers can easily search for items that meet their 
needs.75  Customers can also set up time-phased delivery of products that they forecast 
will be needed.  This will help to improve the delivery time which will ultimately 
increase military readiness.76  This should also reduce, maybe even eliminate, the number 
of buy-arounds being performed by individual units.  Hopefully, the customers will 
recognize the new capabilities and speed of DLA and begin to utilize the new and 
improved agency.  This way, DLA will be able to take advantage of volume discounts, 
reduce transportation costs, and track order information to use in forecasting future needs.  
Ultimately this should reduce the costs associated with individual units ordering their 
own supplies that should have been ordered through DLA. 
The new system will use an open systems architecture which will allow the 
system to be integrated with supplier and customer systems.  This way, DLA will have 
the ability to monitor supplier performance.  The system will also have demand planning 
tools which will allow DLA to better forecast demand of products by tracking customer 
orders.77  If DLA has a better understanding of the future needs of items, by looking at 
past ordering patterns, they can notify suppliers and suppliers will be able to better plan 
their production runs and delivery schedules.  Ultimately, this will reduce the amount of 
inventory that needs to be carried and will reduce costs to the government.  The open 
systems architecture also makes incorporating new technologies simpler and should 
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Although it is difficult to associate a monetary value with the benefits listed 
above, it seems that the many benefits are going to reduce the costs associated with 
ordering and delivering the products.  First of all, the training should not take as long and 
the use of a web-based help system should ease the burden on actual employees, 
ultimately reducing the salaries needed to cover training and support.  Also, the ability to 
work with suppliers and better forecast needs will help to reduce the amount of inventory 
needed, which will reduce inventory holding costs.  DLA will also be able to take 
advantage of bulk discounts and long-term supplier relationships thanks to the better 
forecasting and planning abilities and will save money.  The ability to keep track of items 
and where they are located will also help to get items to the users faster.  DLA can now 
move items from one unit that may have too many items on hand or not need them 
immediately and ship the items to another location that has an immediate need.  
Warfighters will be able to receive their supplies at the time needed and will be better 
prepared to perform their missions. 
 
D. DEFENSE ENTERPRISE AND ACCOUNTING MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
1. Introduction 
Financial accounting reform was what instigated the efforts within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to modernize and fix the legacy systems discussed earlier 
in this paper.  That being said, it is only fitting that we examine what efforts are currently 
being made inside the financial management community to improve the current state of 
business systems and bring them into the 21st Century.  This case study will examine the 
Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS): a financial and 
accounting software package designed to streamline and improve financial data flow 
within the DOD.   
2. Background 
As we touched on briefly in the introduction to this case study, it was the financial 
management community that initially came under fire due to its outdated accounting 
software.  With the creation of the Business Management Modernization Program 
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(BMMP), the first defense-wide push was made to modernize, fix, and integrate these 
legacy accounting systems.  As a result of this push, The Defense Enterprise Accounting 
and Management System or DEAMS was born.  DEAMS is a joint initiative between 
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).  The primary purpose for the initiative 
was to develop an accounting system platform that hopefully will become the “solution” 
to the legacy accounting systems woes faced by the USAF major commands, DFAS and 
USTRANSCOM by integrating the functions of multiple accounting and finance software 
into a single software package. 
DEAMS is designed to be a one-stop, completely paperless system, that when 
fully implemented will handle and distribute all relevant data in electronic form.  The 
system will make use of data warehouses to control and store the flow of data.  It will 
then support and replace a myriad of existing processes to include general ledger, budget 
distribution, fund control, budget execution, customer order and billing, collections, 
purchase requests, obligations, receipt and acceptance, accounts payable, cost accounting, 
analysis, and decision support.79
DEAMS planners have arranged for the systems to be incrementally phased into 
full use in three increments.  The first increment (version1.1) will replace five major 
legacy accounting systems and incorporate data from numerous feeder systems.  The 
major legacy systems being replaced by DEAMS are: the Air Force General Accounting 
and Finance System (GAFS), Integrated Accounts Payable System (IAPS), Automated 
Business Services System (ABSS), Airlift Services Industrial Fund Computer System 
(ASIFICS), and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command’s (SDDC) software 
package Transportation Financial Management System (TFMS-M).  This increment is 
scheduled for release by October 2007 and will be implemented at USTRANSCOM, Air 
Mobility Command (AMC) and other tenant organizations located at Scott Air Force 
Base, Illinois, which is USTRANSCOM headquarters.   
 
79 Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS). (2005). DEAMS software contract 
awarded to oracle. DEAMS Current Account Newsletter(August), September 27, 2005 from 
http://deams.transcom.mil/files/DEAMS_8_25_05.pdf
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The next phase (version 2.1) will include rolling the DEAMS package out to other 
USAF operational major commands as well as the Air Force Material Command 
(AFMC).  The third and final phase is perhaps the loftiest which includes implementing 
DEAMS across other DOD agencies and sister services.  Should this last phase occur, it 
will have a monumental impact on the way we collect, distribute and process financial 
data throughout DOD.  In addition, DOD will move one step closer to achieving Chief 
Financial Officers Act compliance through producing clean, auditable financial 
statements. 80   
3. Methodology – Reengineering or Reinvention 
Many attempts have been made by DOD and other federal agencies to “fix” the 
longstanding issues associated with the antiquity of current DOD business and financial 
systems.  In these previous attempts, DOD has tried to reengineer legacy business 
systems by creating newer versions of the same systems to correct overlooked 
requirements or by updating them with new capabilities that make the systems more 
efficient.  As discussed in Chapter II, many of these modernization efforts have taken 
place independently of one another, thus never fixing the underlying problem of 
integration and achieving overall efficiency.   
Additionally, there is an opportunity cost to the warfighter.  We need good 
reliable financial systems that report accurate data that can be used in making decisions 
that directly support our core mission as warfighters.  Despite these requirements, DOD 
continues to spend 80 percent of appropriated funds designated for information 
technology on systems operations and maintenance and the remaining 20 percent on 
systems modernization efforts.81  DOD can not keep pace with the increasing costs 
associated with legacy systems, creating a vicious cycle.  As the systems get older, they 
require more money to maintain and as the frontline warfighter has a more active role, 
more funding is required to support their missions.  As a result of these constantly 
shifting needs, the money that was designated for maintaining legacy systems instead 
 
80 Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System Website. DEAMS 101 brief. Retrieved August - 
November, 2005 from http://deams.transcom.mil/?page=faq.deams
81 GAO-05-723T 
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goes to support the warfighter and the money that would have been spent on modernizing 
business systems goes towards the operations and maintenance of the legacy systems.  In 
the end, very little is spent fixing the problem through modernization efforts.   
DEAMS is headed in a new direction for accounting and financial systems within 
DOD.  Although attempts were made in the past to better integrate business systems with 
one another, the developers of DEAMS saw the clear need for a single accounting and 
finance system that could replace multiple finance and accounting systems in use.  In 
addition, DEAMS will use a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) approach to solving the 
problem.  This will enable them to find and implement industry best practices within the 
DOD financial management community.  For these reasons, we feel that the methodology 
being followed by DEAMS developers is reinvention.   
4. Potential Problems/Issues 
The first potential issue surrounding DEAMS is the use of COTS.  Although the 
idea of using a COTS product for this initiative is novel, it is almost certain that a number 
of modifications to the original software package will have to take place to ensure that 
the software can perform the required budgetary accounting required within DOD.  Once 
several modifications are made to the software, COTS advantages quickly fade as 
warranties become void and costs increase because of the additional support and 
programming required.   
Another potential problem with DEAMS using COTS is total life-cycle costs.  
Oracle Corporation, the contractor awarded the $22.7 million firm-fixed price contract to 
develop the software, will most certainly have updated and new releases of the 
underlying COTS software in the future.  If too many major modifications are requested 
and designed into the software by Oracle and DEAMS developers, they may end up back 
at square one when it comes time to upgrade the software. 
To counter this issue, managers and developers on the DEAMS project team will 
have to make tradeoffs.  They will have to decide what they can and cannot live with in 
the software and give up, to some degree, the amount of customization.  They must 
consider the long term costs of upgrades and maintenance. 
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The second concern is the systems interfaces.  According to a brief given at the 
American Society of Military Comptrollers Annual Professional Development Institute in 
2005 concerning DEAMS, DEAMS programmers plan to use crosswalks to enable the 
DEAMS software to accept Air Force lines of accounting.82  These crosswalks are very 
costly and labor intensive to have programmed properly.  The cost prohibitive nature of 
crosswalks forced DFAS to abandon using them in its development of the Corporate 
Database/DFAS Corporate Warehouse (DCD/DCW).  This is an area of concern not only 
due to the potential upfront costs, but also the continual stream of crosswalks that must be 
programmed into the software as outside federal agencies independently develop their 
own financial software. 
DEAMS programmers will also use data warehouses to store the data that is being 
received by the many feeder systems.  These data warehouses must be set up in such a 
way that they can accurately receive and interpret the data from the external systems and 
then be able to process and transmit the data into the DEAMS system.  Another way to 
manage this possible problem would be for managers of DEAMS, once fully 
implemented, to closely govern and manage the number and types of systems that will be 
able to feed data into DEAMS.  By getting a hold on this early and managing it from the 
beginning they can better integrate and manage the quality of data maintained in the 
system. 
The third point is the perception of the program.  DEAMS must avoid being 
viewed or perceived as the “pet project” of the month.  Members in the financial 
management community have seen several projects/initiates that have floundered, not 
because they were bad programs but because they were viewed negatively.  The Defense 
Travel System (DTS) is an excellent example.  It was perceived by many as a weak 
system that would never work.  Now that it has been implemented it is now perceived as 
a reliable, useful tool.  It was a long and difficult challenge that is ongoing but changes 
were made and users accepted the program. 
 
82 Senn, J. (2005). DEAMS, A Joint USTRANSCOM, AF and DFAS Initiative Presented at the ASMC PDI 2005 
from http://www.asmconline.org/development/pdi.shtml
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With this in mind, it is imperative that DEAMS project leaders establish 
credibility among those involved in the development of the program and convince future 
DEAMS users that the system truly is the direction that DOD wants for the long-term. 
The final issue is the cultural resistance to change found in any organization.  The 
systems used by those in the AF and DOD financial management community have been 
using the same systems for decades.  It is what they know and are comfortable with.  It 
produces the results needed, albeit in convoluted and expensive ways.  Regardless, 
people are comfortable with what they know.  For DEAMS to be successful, leadership 
will also need to break down this cultural barrier and convince those in the financial 
management community that DEAMS is the future, as painful as that might be.83
5. Areas of Success/Accomplishments 
DEAMS has had some victories since its beginning.  A major accomplishment, 
not followed while developing other accounting and software programs, is a joint focus.  
Because DEAMS may become the single accounting and finance software program used 
across all of DOD, developers are working closely with the Army and Navy.  Working 
closely with potential future users should help to eliminate or lessen problems and issues 
related to compatibility in the future. 
Another area of success is the awarding of the DEAMS development contract to 
the software giant Oracle in June 2005.  This contract was awarded as a firm-fixed price 
contract valued at $22.7 million.  This type of contract is good for the government 
because it places the majority of the development risk on the contractor.  This will help 
alleviate cost overruns that are notoriously associated with software development 
contracts and should help keep Oracle on schedule to complete the contract. 
6. GAO/DOD View on Progress 
Due to DEAMS still being in the infancy of its development, there have not been 
any audits conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or other federal 
audit agencies.  Based on previous large scale information technology programs like DTS 
 
83 O’Hare, S. M. (2005). DEAMS, A project management perspective (Term paper Winter 2005 at Naval 
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and the DFAS Corporate Database/DFAS Corporate Warehouse (DCD/DCW), we feel 
that at some point, an audit may be in order to ensure that the contract stays on track and 
meets all intended requirements. 
DOD has been very positive in its opinions regarding DEAMS.  The programmers 
and leaders of the program provide periodic updates to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD).  In addition, the program is being pursued under the blessings of the 
OSD via the BMMP office.  Having the backing of OSD has helped to add to the 
credibility and cooperation among those involved in the development of DEAMS. 
7. Future Developments 
As the DEAMS program progresses, it will be rolled out in an incremental 
approach over several years.  A future development that program managers may want to 
keep an eye on is the real possibility of newer versions of the COTS package being used.  
The COTS platform used to develop DEAMS today will need to be continuously 
upgraded.  This issue and others related to COTS will be discussed later.   
8. Costs and Savings of System Reduction Efforts 
The initial cost of developing DEAMS is $22.7 million: the amount of the Oracle 
contract.  There will be additional costs associated with future versions that will need to 
be developed, training of new employees, and rollout costs such as set up and 
installation..   
If the ultimate goal of DEAMS becomes a reality and does become the single 
accounting system in DOD, it has the potential to save DOD hundreds of millions of 
dollars by eliminating the need to maintain outdated legacy systems.  Although a very 
sensitive issue, there is also a potential labor savings involved with DEAMS.  If DEAMS 
can resolve the issue of manual reentry of data currently required between some 
accounting systems, DOD can save money by no longer needing the labor force to 





                                                
9. Summary 
DEAMS is a great idea because it is a fresh way of looking at, and addressing the 
problem of outdated legacy systems.  Instead of patching or adding to outdated systems, 
DEAMS is attempting to fix all the related legacy system problems by developing a 
single system that does it all.  DEAMS holds the very real potential to be a huge success 
that will revolutionize the way we do accounting in DOD.  It is a system that is long 
overdue.  If successful, it will most certainly bring the finance and accounting systems 
into the 21st century.  Time will tell whether DOD has a real winner on their hands in the 
DEAMS program.  
 
E. DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
RETRIEVAL (DAMIR) 
Acquisition is a critical part of DOD’s operations.  Developing and acquiring new 
weapon systems is essential for the department to fulfill its role as defender of our 
country.  Congress, OMB, and OSD need insight into the current status of programs and 
future plans of each program to make crucial decisions concerning the funding, 
scheduling, and priorities of the various programs.  Other programs could also use 
information on different programs to capitalize on ideas for how to address funding cuts, 
schedule slips, and other issues faced by program managers. 
The following is the Acquisition Community Connection84 definition of Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval: 
DAMIR is a DOD initiative to provide enterprise visibility to acquisition 
program information.  The primary goal of DAMIR is to streamline 
acquisition management and oversight by leveraging the capabilities of a 
net-centric environment.  DAMIR will identify the various data sources 
the Acquisition community uses to manage Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) 
programs and provide a unified web-based interface through which to 
present that information.  DAMIR will enable the OSD, Military Services, 
Congress, and other participating communities to access information 
 
84 The Acquisition Community Connection is a website that unites publicly accessible knowledge communities to 
connect acquisition experts from government and industry. 
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relevant to their missions regardless of the agency or where the data 
resides.  As DAMIR evolves, its components will replace the need for the 
legacy Consolidated Acquisition Reporting System (CARS).  The current 
DAMIR capability consists of two major web-based components: Purview 
and the Virtual Library.85
The Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval provides a web-
based interface that will present information retrieved from the various data sources in 
the acquisition community.86  The first components were officially released in March 
2005.  One of the first steps is to identify all the existing systems that acquisition 
professionals currently use to manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major 
Automated Information Systems and then provide a manner in which to present the 
information.  This way, the various programs will have insight into other acquisition 
programs information, such as the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR).  Since the program is web-based, users only need to 
have a web browser, internet access, and an id and password. 
DAMIR will eventually replace the Consolidated Acquisition Reporting System 
(CARS).  CARS is an outdated system that requires users to reconfigure systems to load 
CARS and requires continuous upgrades and patches, which increases the life cycle costs 
of the system.87  DAMIR will grant access to more timely and accurate information.88  
The two way information flow between the programs and OSD will help to reduce 
reporting requirements.  The information will be stored in a net-centric database, so the 
data will be available to parties that have access and will do away with redundant 
reporting.  The information will also be used by the Office of Management and Budget 
and Congress to help in fulfilling their oversight roles.89  The information will be easily 
 
85 Acquisition Community Connection Website. Defense acquisition management information retrieval system 
(DAMIRS). Retrieved September 12, 2005 from https://acc.dau.mil/simplify/ev.php?ID=76069_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC
86 Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval Website. Homepage. Retrieved September 12, 2005 
from http://www.acq.osd.mil/damir/
87 Consolidated Acquisition Reporting System Website. CARS automated system overview. Retrieved September 
12, 2005 from http://www.acq.osd.mil/cars/
88 Wright, C. (2005). Retrieval system would put procurement info on tap. Government Computer News, 24(17). 
Retrieved September 2, 2005, from http://www.gcn.com/24_17/defense-technology/36244-1.html
89 Alphabet Soup Webpage. Homepage. Retrieved September 12, 2005 from http://www.corpcomm-
inc.com/january2005/alphasoup.htm
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accessible by these groups because the information will be available on the web, so 
anyone with internet access, a login ID, and a password can access the information 
quickly and from any location. 
DAMIR has just recently been released, so there is no actual data to determine if 
the expected benefits have actually been achieved.  The ease and speed of using a web-
based program seems inevitable and the access to accurate, current data will definitely 
assist Congress, OMB, and programs in making decisions in areas such as funding, 
schedule, and performance. 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
SPS was the first business system deployed DOD-wide.  As such, the business 
system has had its share of problems.  The program has incurred major cost overruns and 
numerous schedule slips.  Many of these problems could have been mitigated with better 
acquisition planning in the early stages of the program.  Requirements were not well-
defined, leading to continual software add-ons, causing schedule delays and reliability 
problems.  Extensive modifications to the COTS software package nullified many of the 
advantages inherent with the use of commercial items and created a sole source 
environment for system maintenance and upgrades.  SPS has improved since its initial 
deployment in 1997, but many lessons on effective acquisition and implementation of 
business systems were learned the hard way. 
DLA was able to reduce the number of its legacy systems by half with the 
implementation of a new ERP system.  The web-based system, employing COTS 
software, was deployed in small increments in order to test the system with limited 
applications.  Once the initial deployment was considered successful, later increments 
added more functionality, eventually replacing two legacy systems in their entirety.  The 
ERP system helped DLA achieve better inventory management, reducing overall 
inventory levels and associated holding costs in the process.  The system proved more 
responsive to customer needs, allowing DLA to achieve greater cost savings by 
leveraging its buying power through the use of long-term supplier relationships. 
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DEAMS was one of the first programs launched under the guidance of BMMP.  
This joint initiative between U.S. Transportation Command, the U.S. Air Force, and 
DFAS is designed to be an all-in-one, paperless system that will handle and distribute all 
relevant accounting data in electronic form.  DEAMS seeks to eliminate the inefficiencies 
and redundancies that plague integrated legacy DOD financial accounting systems 
through the use of a single system utilizing COTS software.  DEAMS has been 
successful in its initial phase of implementation.  Continued success could lead to system 
implementation throughout DOD, significantly reducing the number of legacy systems 
employed for financial and accounting purposes and the steadily increasing legacy 
systems maintenance costs. 
DAMIR is a recent DOD initiative that will provide enterprise visibility to 
acquisition program information.  DAMIR is a web-based application that is designed to 
eventually replace CARS: a legacy system currently used in the acquisition community.  
Recently released in mid-2005, little data exists on the effectiveness of DAMIR.  This 
system could signify the beginning of a new wave of net-centric business systems 
employed by DOD.  
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the genesis of business system modernization and the Business 
Management Modernization Program (BMMP), DOD has made great strides in 
advancing the way systems are modernized and implemented.  Based on the case studies 
examined, some areas for improvement do come to light.  This chapter will cover 
recommendations based on observations and research assembled through case study 
analysis.  These areas are: leading change; the use of commercial off the shelf products;  
the importance of a structured acquisition process; and, better integration of business 
systems. 
 
B. LEADING CHANGE 
Probably the biggest single factor in making any significant change in an 
organization is effective change management.  Without it, the change initiative is likely 
to fail.  As the Department of Defense (DOD) transforms its business systems, the need 
for appropriate leadership is even greater due in large part to previous attempts at 
financial reform that have failed.  This section will discuss the need for leadership and the 
resistance to change that is pervasive in the culture of each military service and DOD. 
1. Why Change is Difficult in the DOD 
There are several contributing factors that act as roadblocks to implementing 
change in DOD.  The primary factors are: the parochialism of the military services, 
several decades of a “business-as-usual” mentality, and the lack of incentives to change.   
In the book The Masks of War, American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
by Carl Builder, the author presents an interesting insight into how the culture of each of 
the military services affects the way they lay out strategies and analysis. 90  Builder notes 




independence and stature.”  He further points out that the Air Force sees itself as an 
“embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by 
modern technology.”  Last, but certainly not least, is the Army.  Builder characterizes the 
Army as, “the essential artisans of war…forged by history and the nature of war into a 
mutually supportive brotherhood of guilds.” 
From these observations, it becomes easier to see why each service has differing 
cultural resistance to change.  Exploring Builders observations, it appears that the Navy 
will change when it decides to change and no sooner.  This helps to explain why the 
Navy has so many business systems with which they operate.     
Looking at Builders observations of the Air Force, as long as it deals with better, 
more modern technology, the Air Force will support the idea.  This helps to explain why 
the Air Force is one of the primary supporters and developers of the Defense Enterprise 
Accounting and Management System (DEAMS).  Not that this will make implementing 
change easy for the Air Force, but the Air Force has a culture that accepts technological 
advances more readily than other services. 
Despite the pros or cons of each service’s identity they all have one thing in 
common; they are products of their cultures.  The world renowned expert on 
organizational culture Edgar Schein defines organizational culture as, “The pattern of 
basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning 
to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have 
worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”  This 
definition could not be more correct in defining the culture of DOD.  Each respective 
military service and federal agency possesses ideals that have been ingrained by past 
experiences and traditions that make it extremely difficult for change to take place 





                                                
2. Business-as-Usual Mentality  
Many of the financial systems now in use have been around for several years and 
been piecemealed together over time to fit the changing needs of each organization using 
the particular business or financial system.  Users of the legacy business systems are 
comfortable with what they know.  Users often do not want to change because they feel 
like the new system is not better or that it will not help make their jobs easier.  They resist 
the change because the old way of doing business is what they know and are comfortable 
with.  Implementing change of any magnitude forces an individual out of their comfort 
zone.  As a result, those affected by the change initiative often “dig-in” and either 
passively or actively resist the change.  Often people resist change because they do not 
see the need for change, they may fear the unknown, or they may fear losing any status or 
security they have developed as an “expert” under the old way of conducting business, 
etc. 
3. Incentive to Change 
The final contributing factor to why change is so difficult to implement in DOD is 
the lack of incentive to change.  According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the 
success of a DOD manager’s career is based on a program moving forward and not on 
achieving better outcomes.91  Based on this conclusion by GAO, it is no wonder that we 
have so many financial systems.  As system problems were encountered, managers have 
a tendency to throw money at the problem or use a patchwork homegrown approach to 
fixing the issue to keep the program headed in the “right” direction.  Program cost is not 
always considered a major factor as long as the job gets done and the mission progresses.   
This was the case with the Standard Procurement System (SPS).  Despite it falling 
behind schedule by five years, being a $1 billion over initial life cycle cost estimates, and 
not achieving its established requirements, the program continued on with full support 
from DOD.  As of July 2005, SPS has still not been fully implemented.  There has been 
no incentive for SPS program managers to change the way they conduct business.  By 
 
91 General Accounting Office. (2003). Department of defense: Status of financial management weaknesses and 
progress toward reform (No. GAO-03-931T). Washington, DC: GAO. 
 54
dragging out the length of the program, intentional or not, users of systems SPS is 
designed to replace are able to continue using the legacy systems.   
4. Change Theories 
Creating change in an organization is not easy or pretty.  Of all the change 
implementation frameworks, Kurt Lewin, has the best framework for understanding how 
to make change happen and become permanent.  His framework employs the following 
three phases: unfreezing the system, moving towards a new orientation and then 
refreezing attitudes and behaviors.  Lewin’s framework, in addition to John P. Kotter’s 
Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change (see Figure 1) will be the basis for 

















                                                
Figure 1.   The Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change92 
 
92 Kotter, J. P. (1996). Leading change. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard School Press. 
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5. Unfreezing Change 
How do you unfreeze a leviathan like DOD where bureaucratic methods of doing 
business are the norm?  Using Kotter’s model as a guide, the first thing is to create a 
sense of urgency.  Those leading the change effort must create a sense of urgency that 
instigates people throughout the organization to adopt the change.  In order for DEAMS 
or any other business system reform effort to be successful, all potential users must feel a 
sense of urgency and a need for change.  In the case of SPS, there has been no clear sense 
of urgency.  Consequently, the program is far behind schedule and has not been 
universally accepted by proposed users. 
Another way to unfreeze change is to create a guiding coalition.  Many times 
people are put “in charge” of a project but not given decision making authority.  Other 
times, a management team is put together that has differing goals, ambitions, and 
personalities.  Teams of this nature are generally their own worst enemy.  They become 
weak, powerless, and ineffective, often heading towards certain failure.  To successfully 
implement future business systems, or any change in DOD, strong teams must be created 
and not groups of individuals.  These teams must have the power to unfreeze the old way 
of doing business and be empowered to make decisions that have enough gravitas to 
make a difference. 
Finally, change agents must create and communicate a strategic vision for change.  
A vision provides focus and motivation for the program.  Having a clearly communicated 
vision can mitigate some of the resistance to change by providing a sense of direction and 
assurance that change leaders know what direction they want to lead the program.  More 
importantly, leaders of any new program must personally believe in the program and the 
vision.  They must, as Kotter’s model implies, role-model the behavior they expect from 
others. 
The Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) has done a very 




clear from the BMMP website that program leaders care about the initiative.  On the 
BMMP homepage, they have their mission posted very prominently for each visitor of 
the site to see. 
DEAMS and the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) system are both new programs and still in the infancy of their life cycles.  Now 
is the time for leaders of both programs to get the word out concerning their vision.  
DEAMS leaders recently used industry meetings like the American Society of Military 
Comptrollers Annual Professional Development Institute (PDI) to get the word out 
through information booths and handouts.  Both programs have done a good job so far 
through their individual websites, but they should also try to spread the word through 
DOD financial management and acquisition trade publications.  The more people know 
about the programs, the less resistance in the long run. 
6. Moving Towards a New Orientation   
People like what they know and distrust what they do not know.  Once you have 
unfrozen the old way of doing business it is imperative to get people on board with the 
new.  Change leaders must get rid of obstacles to the change.  With business systems, 
they must implement the new system and get rid of the system it replaced.  If the old 
system is left in place alongside the new one, there is a very good chance that the 
majority of users will revert back to using the old system with which they are most 
comfortable.   
Leaders should encourage out of the box thinking and encourage fresh ideas.  As 
leaders listen and give credibility to others’ ideas, people affected by the change 
gradually gain a sense of ownership and eventually pride in the system.  Leaders should 
reward the ideas as they see these changes develop.  Publicly acknowledging ideas that 
support the change effort will encourage others to get on board, adopt the change, and 






                                                
7. Refreeze Attitudes and Behaviors 
Both Lewin and Kotter point out that the final stage in creating change is to 
refreeze or anchor the new behaviors into the culture.  This can be accomplished by 
continually reemphasizing and rewarding the behaviors that were prevalent during the 
movement to a new orientation phase.  Link the successes of the organization with the 
change.  Allow the change in behavior and culture to feed on itself.  As people see the 
newly accepted norms, they will either accept them as their own or leave the 
organization.  The key though is to create and groom leaders who will continue to support 
and encourage the new attitudes and behaviors.   
8. Strong Leadership 
The key to implementing and sustaining major change is to have a leader who is 
willing to step forward and act as a champion.  The Office of Secretary of Defense - 
Comptroller (OSD-C) iCenter website states that a change agent must have the clout, 
conviction, and charisma to make things happen and keep people actively engaged in the 
change process.93  In the case of former business systems modernization attempts, perhaps 
their failure can be partially attributed to the lack of a strong change agent.  They may 
have had leadership in the sense of someone being “in charge,” but they may have lacked 
the necessary personality traits of a change leader to implement a successful change. 
A problem that also stands in the way of major changes in DOD is the length of 
tours of program leaders.  In order for changes to really become ingrained, DOD needs to 
keep the leader in the job for longer periods of time.  Currently the average length of a 
senior political appointee is 1.7 years and 2-3 years for government and military leaders94.  
This is too short a time to effectively implement long-term, lasting changes.  The length 
of senior leadership tours must be extended for better continuity.  Having a leader around 
for longer tours might also reduce the mentality of “waiting out the boss” and aid in 
freezing the new changes into the culture of the organization. 
 
 
93 OSD Comptroller iCenter Website. Change management, guiding organizations through transitions. Retrieved 
October 10, 2005 from http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/learn/changeman.htm
94 GAO-03-931T 
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9. Summary 
Long-term change cannot be cajoled or forced.  It requires hard work from top 
management down to the lowest ranking person in the organization and everyone in 
between.  It requires a strong change agent and long-term leadership.  It requires finesse 
and patience, but the gains from successfully implementing major change make it worth 
the hard work. 
 
C. COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) PRODUCTS IN DOD 
BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
All four of the case studies discussed previously in our research used COTS 
products and software in varying forms and amounts in their systems.  But what exactly 
is COTS and why is it so important in current business modernization efforts pursued by 
DOD?  Does the use of COTS products ensure program success?  Is customization of 
COTS products a good idea?  First, we will lay out the background behind the current 
emphasis on commercial item acquisition and COTS.  Next, we will examine the 
common pros and cons connected with the use of COTS.  Lastly, we will list and discuss 
seven best practices suggested for the use of COTS in DOD business systems. 
1. Background on COTS in DOD 
The impetus for the use of COTS dates back to the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994.  This act requires DOD to use commercial items to the 
maximum extent practicable.95  Market research must be accomplished prior to 
development of a new specification or soliciting for proposals to see if commercial items 
are available to meet the user’s need.  This legislation recognized the fact that the 
commercial marketplace had supplanted the military as the leader in technology 
development and implementation.  As a consequence of the shift in technological 
leadership, DOD needed to capitalize on the opportunities now available in the 
commercial marketplace in order to keep pace with the changes. 
 
95 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. (2000). Ensuring successful implementation of commercial 
items in air force systems No. SAB-TR-99-03). Washington, DC: USAF Scientific Advisory Board. 
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There is an important distinction between the definition of a commercial item and 
the definition of commercial off-the-shelf.  The commercial item definition in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is very broad in scope.  It includes products and services 
that have been sold, leased or licensed or offered for sale, lease, or license to the general 
public.  The definition allows for modifications customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace as well as minor modifications in order to meet government requirements.96  
The FAR does not specify what are considered minor versus major modifications, giving 
the acquisition community a great amount of discretion on this matter.   
The FAR does not define COTS.  COTS products are offered to the general 
public; supported, maintained and continually evolved by the vendor and used without 
modification of internal parts.97  The narrow definition of COTS in comparison to the 
commercial item definition is significant.  The advantages that can be obtained by 
acquiring commercial items are maximized when purchasing COTS.  The current 
definition of COTS is similar to the commercial item definition in the FAR prior to the 
acquisition reforms of the mid-1990’s. 
2. Pros/Cons of COTS 
While its use is highly encouraged, COTS is not appropriate for every program 
and does not guarantee success.  In fact, COTS can cause more problems and result in 
higher total ownership costs (TOC) than employing a custom solution, as seen in the 
Standard Procurement System case.  There are benefits as well as problems associated 
with the use of COTS in DOD.  Knowledge of these issues will enable acquisition 
professionals involved with future systems to determine if COTS is even appropriate for 
the situation.  If COTS is appropriate, the acquisition community will be better equipped 
to capitalize on the benefits and mitigate the problems with COTS when crafting the 
acquisition strategies for future DOD business systems. 
There are a number of significant benefits associated with COTS.  The first 
benefit is the high reliability that comes with COTS.  COTS must be highly reliable or it 
 
96 Gansler, J. (2000). Commercial item acquisition: Considerations and lessons learned, USD (AT&L) 
memorandum. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
97 Gansler 
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would not be successful in the commercial market.  Another benefit is the faster times 
associated with product development than a custom system, since the commercial product 
is readily available.  Initial purchase costs for COTS products are typically lower than 
custom systems.  This is due to development costs for the commercial product spread 
over a large customer base.  Vendor support services for the life of the product are an 
additional benefit to COTS products/software.98
While the potential benefits of COTS are impressive, there are some problems 
that can occur.  One problem is that COTS products, especially software, are often 
released before they are ready.  The rush to be the first to market is a major cause of this 
phenomenon.  The customer is then left to fix the problems with the software 
themselves.99
Short life cycles for COTS products are another problem.  The majority of DOD 
systems are just the opposite; they are defined by very long life cycles.  This forces DOD 
to find ways to keep up with the changes in the commercial market, as well as have a 
recovery plan for products/software that vendors will no longer support.  This shifts much 
of the leverage away from DOD and towards the commercial marketplace. 
Most COTS products are incapable of providing a 100 percent solution for DOD.  
The real problem concerns the method chosen to reduce the gap between the COTS 
capabilities and the customer’s requirements.  The gap can be reduced by modifications 
to COTS products to increase or improve capabilities or adjust their business processes to 
fit the COTS product. 
Modifying COTS products leads to a number of serious problems.  Modified 
commercial off-the-shelf products, also known as MOTS, loose many of the advantages 
commonly associated with COTS products.  For software products, once the software is 
modified, the software will no longer be compatible with the vendor’s future upgrades 
 
98 USAF Scientific Advisory Board 
Sampson, J. Jr. (1999). Building Dependable Systems using COTS from http://www.crhs.uiuc.edu/FTCS-
29/sampson.pdf
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and releases100.  Modifications almost guarantee the emergence of a sole source 
environment.  Only the vendor that made the initial modifications will be able to provide 
system maintenance and custom upgrades.  Being “locked in” to one vendor raises the 
system’s TOC, potentially making MOTS more expensive in the long run than a custom 
system. 
3. Best Practices 
With the potential pitfalls inherent in acquiring systems incorporating COTS 
products, DOD needs to develop and incorporate COTS best practices in order to gain the 
maximum benefits from using COTS products.  These best practices will help determine 
the appropriate use of COTS and facilitate in the delivery of more reliable, lower total 
cost business systems for DOD with shorter lead times than custom systems.  The seven 
best practices we recommend for COTS –based business systems are listed below101: 
 
a. Component modification 
b. Organization change management 
c. Configuration management  
d. Legacy systems integration planning 
e. Solicitation 
f. Vendor and product research and evaluation 
g. Tradeoff analysis 
 
a. Component Modification 
Modification of COTS needs to be highly discouraged, but not prohibited.  
Minor modifications may be justified if it can be demonstrated that life cycle costs will 
not skyrocket and that the benefits outweigh the increase in total costs over the life of the 
system.  Modifications virtually eliminate all of the benefits received from buying a 
 
100 Goodenough, J., Pollak, B., & Sha, L. (2004). Simplex architecture: Meeting the challenges of using COTS in 
high-reliability systems. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute. 
101 GAO-04-722 
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commercial item.  Modifying COTS in order to replicate an existing business process is 
not the way to benefit from the use of COTS.   
b. Organizational Change Management 
The use of COTS calls for flexible requirements from the customer.  This 
flexibility may allow the use of a COTS product that offers an 80 percent solution to the 
customer’s needs.  The capabilities gap may be reduced by reengineering the end user’s 
business processes to better fit the COTS product.102  A fundamental change in mindset 
must accompany the shift to COTS products.  When pursuing a COTS-based acquisition 
strategy, you are purchasing a new business process as well as the actual product.103
c. Configuration Management 
Centralized configuration management is paramount with the use of 
COTS products.  Many systems will have a multitude of COTS products that have widely 
varying maintenance and upgrade schedules.  The rapid technology turnover that is an 
attribute of COTS makes centralized configuration management crucial.104  Staying 
current with the latest upgrade is essential.105  Vendors will normally support only the two 
most recent releases of their products.  If the user does not plan for system upgrades, 
vendor support may not continue for the life of the system.   
d. Legacy Systems Integration Planning 
The high number of legacy business systems in DOD necessitates detailed 
integration planning for new COTS systems.  The vendor not only must deliver a reliable 
working system of their own, but also must be able to link their system with existing 
business systems.  The vendor must be able to realistically forecast the additional time 
and effort necessary to successfully complete this effort.106
 
102 Barchi, T. J. (1997). Evaluation of best practices for developing and implementing integrated financial 
management system (Special Evaluation Report No. OIG/97E-10). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 
103 Carney, D., & Sledge, C. (1998). Case study: Evaluating COTS products for DOD information systems. 
Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute. 
104 Gansler 
105 USAF Scientific Advisory Board 
106 GAO-04-722 
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e. Solicitation 
The information contained in the solicitation needs to specifically address 
three areas.  The first area is data rights and license agreements.  These areas need to be 
negotiated up front in order to avoid costly mistakes following contract award.107   The 
next area concerns evaluation factors.  The solicitation should state that the vendor should 
have valid prior experience employing COTS-based solutions.108  Most importantly, use 
TOC as one of the source selection criterion.  Vendors will then focus on the total life 
cycle cost of the system, not simply the initial purchase cost.    
f. Vendor and Product Research and Evaluation 
COTS products require a high level of market and product research in 
order to find the best fit.  One area of research involves the financial health and 
short/long-term strategies of vendors within a particular market.  This mitigates the risk 
of selecting a vendor that may go out of business, leaving the system without support.  
Another research area concerns the duration of product support the vendor is willing to 
provide.109  This could affect the vendor selected, depending on the expected life span of 
the product.  
g. Tradeoff Analysis 
Users must understand the tradeoffs present with COTS products.  
Typically, initial system cost is much lower than a custom system.  The user must 
remember to factor in the support, maintenance and upgrade costs inherent when 
acquiring COTS-based systems.  The customer must be able to accurately budget for the 
system over the entire life cycle of the system.  Total ownership costs must be thoroughly 






108 USAF Scientific Advisory Board 
109 Carney, D., & Oberndorf, P. The commandments of COTS: Still in search of the promised land. Pittsburgh, 
PA: Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute. 
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D. STRUCTURED ACQUISITION PROCESS 
1. Required Management Framework 
According to the Government Accountability Office, “the way in which DOD has 
historically acquired information technology (IT) systems has been cited as the root cause 
of these systems failing to deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within 
budget.”110  One of the best practices for business systems acquisition is acquisition 
planning of the entire acquisition process.111  DOD has a management framework that 
addresses this practice, but there are no policies that ensure programs are properly 
applying this best practice.112  DOD requires the use of the management framework as 
described in DODI 5000.2113 for all acquisition programs.  An acquisition program is any 
“directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, or continuing material, weapon or 
information system, or service capability.”114  Therefore, the guidance applies to business 
systems as a subset of information systems.  The purpose of DODI 5000.2 is to establish 
“a simplified and flexible management framework for translating mission needs and 
technology opportunities, based on approved mission needs and requirements, into stable, 
affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs that include weapon systems and 






113 Defense Acquisition Guidebook Website. (2003). Operation of the defense acquisition system (No. DODI 
5000.2). Retrieved October 20, 2005 from http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&doc=2 
114 GAO-04-722 
115 DODI 5000.2 
 
 
Figure 2.   DOD Management Framework (From DODI 5000.2 p2) 
 
 
2. Previous Issues 
The process must begin with good, well-defined requirements.  This has been an 
issue in the past.  For example, the case study performed on the Standard Procurement 
System (SPS) uncovered some issues in the requirements generation area.  As noted in 
the case, personnel were not even sure which systems SPS was supposed to replace.  It is 
difficult to procure a system that will have the correct capabilities when the required 
capabilities are unclear. 
The framework allows for systems to enter at Milestone A, B, or C depending on 
the maturity of the technology being used.  Since many business systems are commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) items, many enter at Milestone C.  Concept Refinement is the 
period of time used for refining the initial concept and determining if an evolutionary 
approach is appropriate for the acquisition.116  Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred 
DOD strategy when appropriate.  The program should balance needs and available 
capability with the resources available to provide a useful capability to the user as quickly 
as possible.117
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116 Evolutionary acquisition is an acquisition strategy that allows increments of useful capability to be fielded to 
the user more quickly than a typical acquisition strategy that provides the full capability, but takes longer to develop.  
More information is available in the Memorandum from Secretary Aldridge, April 12, 2002. 
117 DODI 5000.2 
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Technology Development is the stage when user requirements are refined and the 
appropriate technologies that will be integrated into the system are determined.  For 
business area capabilities, commercially available solutions will be employed whenever 
appropriate and Automated Information Systems (AIS), which are often used as business 
systems, shall answer the following questions affirmatively:TP118PT  
• Does the acquisition support core/priority mission functions that need to 
be performed by the Federal Government? 
• Does the acquisition need to be undertaken by the DOD Component 
because no alternative private sector or governmental source can better 
support the function?  
• Does the acquisition support work processes that have been simplified or 
otherwise redesigned to reduce costs, improve effectiveness, and make 
maximum use of commercial off-the-shelf technology? 
System Development and Demonstration is entered once the system has mature 
technology, approved requirements, and funding.  During this stage the system, or 
increment if using evolutionary acquisition, is integrated and the capability is 
demonstrated in its intended environment.  For business systems, this may include 
handling a subset of the data the system should track or store.   
Production and Deployment involves operational test and evaluation to determine 
the operational suitability of the system.  Software must demonstrate the appropriate 
maturity level.  This is another area where SPS did not completely follow the appropriate 
planning.  The system was not tested in the appropriate environment.  Although an 
evolutionary strategy was employed, the users were resistant to the change and software 
problems were not worked out before handing off to the users.  This created more 
problems (resistance to change)TP119PT because the users were unhappy with the system since 
it did not provide them with a useful capability. 
The Operations and Support phase is usually the longest phase in the life cycle of 
a system.  This is when a support program should be executed that meets the needs of the 
                                                 
118 DODI 5000.2 
119 This is further addressed in the Standard Procurement System case study in Chapter IV and some ways for 
leadership to address this issue is in the Leadership portion of this chapter. 
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user and sustains the system in the most cost effective manner.  For business systems this 
phase will include upgrades to the system, incorporating new technologies as they 
become available, and training.  This phase should be considered during the earlier 
phases to avoid issues and unforeseen sustainment issues.  If using an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy, plans should be made to replace or modify previously fielded 
versions of the system with the latest increment. 
The final stage is Disposal.  This refers to eliminating the system from use.  This 
is fairly simple and requires removing the software from computers or disposing of 
program specific computers. 
Throughout the system’s life cycle, investment decisions should be based on 
tradeoffs between capabilities available, requirements of the system, cost and schedule 
restraints, and the architectural environment the system must operate in.  Any changes 
that are incorporated must be passed on to the user, as they will affect how the system is 
used. 120   
3. Steps Already Taken to Improve the Process 
The Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) has already started 
to address some of the issues seen in the past while procuring business systems.  The 
Investment Review Board (IRB) has been established to provide oversight and review of 
business systems modernization efforts that exceed $1 million.  The program will be 
reviewed and approval will be through the IRB.  The IRB will “assess modernization 
investments relative to their impact on end-to-end business process improvements 
supporting warfighter needs.”121  Then the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee (DBSMC) is responsible for approving investment decisions and continually 
monitoring schedule and milestone completeness, costs and resources, performance 
 
120 GAO-04-722 
121 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 18, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/manage_entities.html  
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metrics, and risks.TP122PT  This oversight will provide incentive for programs to follow the 
required management framework and deliver useful business systems to the users. 
4. Recommended Further Actions 
BMMP has made a good start on ensuring that efficient, effective business 
systems are delivered to the users.  Since good requirements assist in making the 
framework effective, it will be beneficial for BMMP to inspect requirements and make 
sure the programs develop and refine the requirements to deliver the necessary 
capabilities.  This will assist in following the framework, since good requirements are the 
foundation for sticking to the schedule associated with the management framework.  The 
following is a list of guidelines to follow when generating requirements:TP123PT 
• Keep users involved 
• Develop and refine requirements 
• Define and use consistent terminology, organize requirements, 
monitor/track development and changes, document all requirements and 
changes and why they changed 
• Make requirements management a repeatable process 
• Match resources available and requirements  
The most important of these is user involvement.  Having a knowledgeable person 
who has used the existing system, knows the processes currently used, and can help 
prioritize requirements will result in requirements that meet the needs of those who will 
be using the system on a daily basis.  As previously mentioned in the SPS case study, this 
was not done and has resulted in an ineffective system that users were reluctant to 
accommodate.  If those who implemented SPS had, at the very least, gotten some input 
from personnel who would be using the system, there would have been some buy-in on 
the user side.  This could have helped to decrease the resistance to change from the users’ 
side and even if the system was not the 100 percent solution, users may have been more 
willing to try to make the system work.  With the implementation of BMMP, steps are 
                                                 
122 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 18, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/manage_entities.html  
123 Turk, W. (2005). Mission Possible…With good requirements. Defense AT&L, XXXIV(5), 20. and General 
Accounting Office. (2001). Better matching of needs and resources will lead to better weapon system outcomes (No. 
GAO-01-288). Washington, DC: GAO. 
 70
already being taken to better involve users.  DEAMS is one example where DOD has 
considered user involvement.  Even though the system is currently being released to the 
Air Force, they are working with potential future users (Navy and Army) to ensure the 
needs of all services and organizations are met. 
Developing and refining requirements is also important.  Once the requirements 
are defined, it is necessary to refine these throughout the acquisition process, specifically 
in the technology development phase if not using COTS technology.  If a system does not 
perform as needed or additional information is gathered resulting in new/different 
requirements, the requirements should be updated and the system should be updated.  
Upgrades and improvements should be planned into the requirements, especially for 
software systems.  With technology constantly changing, requirements should include 
ways to incorporate improvements.  This way, systems can stay up to date without having 
to develop or purchase entirely new systems. 
One way to do this would be to plan to use an evolutionary acquisition process or 
at least schedule preplanned product improvements.  Throughout the life cycle of the 
system, requirements will be revisited and improvements will be made.  New 
technologies can be examined and either added to the existing system or replace portions 
of the system currently being used.  In the case of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 
this worked very well.  Instead of simply throwing the system out to the user, small 
increments were used for specific products to ensure that the system could handle the 
entire inventory it was supposed to track.  This left multiple systems running for a while 
and users had to be comfortable with both, but ultimately resulted in a system that met all 
the needs.  If it hadn’t worked, it would have been fairly simple to move the few items 
that were being tracked in the new system back to the old system.  Therefore, the users of 
the DLA system did not have all of their eggs in one basket and could be sure that the 
new system would work properly before inputting all their data into the system.  DEAMS 
is also using a similar method for introducing the system through three increments. 
Defining and using consistent terminology, organizing requirements, monitoring 
and tracking development and changes, documenting all requirements and changes, and 
why they changed are just good management rules that should be incorporated into most 
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projects.  Having well-defined terminology will reduce the confusion between the buying 
office, the user, and the producer of the system.  This way all stakeholders will be on the 
same page and should understand the requirements of the system.  Without a common 
terminology, it is difficult to deliver a system that meets the needs.  All changes to 
requirements should be monitored and documented so that the cause for the changes can 
be examined.  Changes often lead to an increase in cost and schedule, so a good rationale 
should be documented.  Also, this will assist any newcomers to the process, by bringing 
them up to speed more quickly and it will avoid rehashing resolved issues. 
Making requirements generation a repeatable process is also important, especially 
since the BMMP office will be responsible for overseeing the procurement of business 
systems over $1 million.  There should be a process that can be passed to organizations 
that will help them to develop good requirements, which will ultimately result in better 
systems for the users.  The process should address how to monitor and handle changes 
because technologies and capabilities are constantly changing in the software 
environment.  The BMMP office will also have a better understanding of what the 
organizations need and why they need it.  This will help the BMMP office determine how 
systems being acquired will affect and fit into the Business Enterprise Architecture.124
Matching available resources and requirements is mainly a leadership issue.125  It 
is important to plan for funding to match the systems that are needed.  Right now 
organizations can procure systems without BMMP oversight if they are under $1 million 
threshold.  This may cause organizations to purposely underestimate the cost of the new 
system.  This may result in a cost overrun or not receiving a system that has all the 
necessary capabilities.  In the long run, it will cost more to make changes to the system or 
buy another system that actually performs the intended job.  Tradeoffs will have to be 
made at some point and it is beneficial to the organization procuring the system to have 
an accurate estimate of the cost and the funding available for the new system.  It is also 
important to carefully plan what resources will be available for training and upgrades.  
 
124 The Business Enterprise Architecture is described in Chapter II. 
125 General Accounting Office. (2001). Better matching of needs and resources will lead to better weapon system 
outcomes (No. GAO-01-288). Washington, DC: GAO. 
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The constantly changing software environment requires that upgrades and training be 
included in the acquisition strategy.  This requires funding and should be considered by 
the leadership of the organization. 
5. Summary 
Requirements are one of the most important aspects of procuring new business 
systems.  A good understanding of the necessary capabilities and features needed in the 
new business system will help to assure that the system purchased will perform the 
necessary mission.  Involving skilled users will help to refine the requirements and will 
create an atmosphere in which personnel will be more willing to work with the new 
system because they will have more buy in.  A solid, repeatable requirements process is 
the key and the BMMP office should be responsible for developing and passing on this 
process.  Making sure the resources and requirements are matched will result in better 
cost estimates.  Ultimately, developing good requirements will lead to better 
implementation of the prescribed management framework. 
 
E. INTEGRATION 
1. Importance/Benefits Realized from Integration 
All the activities of DOD are closely related.  Each organization requires 
information from others to perform its mission more efficiently and effectively.  For 
example, in the logistics domain it is important to have accurate information regarding 
location of existing assets, lead time to deliver materiel to locations, and the financial 
status of the organization.  This information will make it easier for decision makers to 
determine the quickest and most cost effective way to purchase and distribute resources.  
Additionally, they will be better able to forecast needs and be able to take better 
advantage of economies of scale when purchasing items.   
In the financial and acquisition arenas, decision makers require access to accurate 
data concerning the status of programs in order to better allocate scarce resources to 
programs based on their historical progress and necessity to DOD.  Additionally, they 
need to comply with federal laws and regulations by delivering a clean audit statement.  
DOD utilizes many different business systems to capture the data needed by decision 
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makers.  In order to permit decision makers to view the necessary information, it would 
be beneficial for the systems to be integrated and provide users with access to timely, 
accurate, and reliable information.  This way many users will have access to the same 
information. 
2. Past Integration Issues 
In the past, organizations would develop business systems that were focused on 
the specific mission of that organization without considering the consequences of not 
integrating with other systems.  This is true not only across the various components, but 
also within the components.  One example of the problems caused by not integrating is 
demonstrated by the inventory systems of DOD.  At one time there were over 200 
systems that were not integrated, so there were multiple data entry points.  This caused 
data to be entered improperly and the data could not be reconciled, so there was no way 
to determine the actual inventory.126  Another example is tracking information technology 
(IT) investments.  The Business Management and Systems Integration127 (BMSI) office 
could not even determine the actual number of existing business systems because their 
three databases were not integrated.128
The stovepiped nature of previous system developments may have helped to 
optimize the subprocess that the system was built for, but it ultimately impairs the overall 
business of DOD.129  Data that was needed for other systems would have to be reentered 
manually into multiple systems, which results in erroneous information due to the 
probability of inducing errors.  This also increases the amount of time other organizations 
have to wait to get the information.130
 
126 Government Accountability Office. (2004). DOD business systems modernization: Billions continue to be 
invested with inadequate management oversight and accountability (No. GAO-04-615). Washington, DC: GAO. 
127 BMSI is the program management office established by the Under Secretary of Defense to oversee and 
manage the Business Management Modernization Program. 
128 GAO-04-615 




                                                
Systems that are not integrated lead to errors that may be critical to the 
completion of DOD’s mission.  In order to deliver the best weapon systems and materiel 
to warfighters in a timely and cost effective manner, decision makers need accurate and 
current information.  Since the push for a more joint environment, integration has become 
even more crucial to DOD. 
3. BMMP Actions Taken to Address Integration Issues 
The Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) has already taken 
steps to better integrate existing and new business systems.  The Business Enterprise 
Architecture (BEA)131 has been designed to focus on instituting an “integrated, realistic, 
and actionable” framework that “builds interoperability across DOD.”132  The BEA 
defines business capabilities, rules, data standards, and operating requirements that are 
intended to improve the ability to deliver capabilities and resources to the warfighter. 
The priorities of BMMP also warrant a more integrated business systems 
environment.  One priority is financial visibility.  This means providing decision makers 
with accurate financial information as soon as possible.  One way BMMP plans to do this 
is by creating and implementing a common financial language across DOD.133  A 
common language will assist in integrating business systems by reducing the need for 
software to translate different words or symbols into other words or symbols specific to a 
different business system.  This will ultimately result in an increase in the speed and 
accuracy of financial reporting and will enable decision makers to better and more 
quickly allocate resources. 
Another priority of BMMP is common supplier engagement.  One of the 
objectives to achieve this goal is the development of interoperable systems across DOD.  
This will require standard business processes, rules, and data.  In addition, BMMP plans 
 
131 The BEA is a blueprint to guide and constrain investments in DOD’s organization, operations and systems as 
they relate to or impact business operations.  More information is available in Chapter II. 
132 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/faq_bea.html 
133 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/priorites_financial.html 
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to use standard data to transform internal interfaces.134  Using standard data will ease 
systems integration by making it simpler to transfer data from one to another. 
One final priority of BMMP that requires systems to be better integrated is 
materiel visibility.  DOD wants to be able to track materiel throughout its life cycle and 
provide transaction visibility across logistics systems.  The result will improve readiness 
by providing real time information on the location and status of equipment.  Materiel 
visibility will lead to optimal deployment of materiel whenever and wherever it is needed 
in the most cost effective manner.135
The case of the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) system is one example where DOD has decided to make the program web-
based to provide access to multiple users at a time.  This allows multiple people to access 
program information and use this to make faster, more informed decisions concerning 
funding, scheduling, and other issues. 
4. Further Actions Needed 
A paradox exists for DOD between the size and complexity of the organization 
and the flexibility needed to perform the mission.  This means that DOD is an extremely 
large and complex organization, but needs the flexibility to change focus at any time.  
This requires that accurate, immediate information be available for decision makers.  An 
integrated network of business systems will assist leadership by providing the necessary 
information.  DOD has recognized that creating individual links between entities is not 
the best approach for an organization as large and complex as DOD.136  That is why 
BMMP plans to improve integration by enhancing the net-centricity of future versions of 
the BEA.137
 
134 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/priorities_common-supplier.html 
135 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/priorities_materiel.html 
136 Walker, R. L. (2002). DOD expects industry to help it achieve net-centricity. Government Computer News, 
21(29). Retrieved October 25, 2005, from http://www.gcn.com/21_29/news/20098-1.html
137 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/faq_bea.html 
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Net-centricity is a global, web-based environment that allows for cross functional 
information exchange.  It will provide users with access to applications, services and data 
that is understandable and assists in the decision making process.138  The department has 
been broken into five Core Business Missions (CBMs) that “integrate horizontally across 
all functional areas (e.g., planning, budgeting, information technology (IT), procurement, 
maintenance, etc.) to provide end-to-end warfighter support.”139  The CBMs are human 
resource management, weapon system lifecycle management, materiel supply and service 
management, real property and installations life cycle management, and financial 
management.  Each of the components will be responsible for integrating the CBMs by 
introducing net-centricity and populating the network with data.140
This new approach to handling data is intended to improve situational awareness, 
provide access to better business information, and shorten decision cycles by securely 
connecting people and systems regardless of time or location without the use of 
predefined interfaces between individual systems.141   
Although this is a great idea, there are still some concerns that exist.  While there 
are some technical142 matters that need to be addressed, the two main areas that need to be 
dealt with relate to culture and security.  One of the most crucial elements of net-





138 Horizontal Fusion Website. About net-centricity. Retrieved October 14, 2005 from 
http://horizontalfusion.dtic.mil/about/net-c.html
139 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 24, 2005 from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/bmmp/mission_unify.html 
140 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 24, 2005 from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/bmmp/mission_alignment.html 
141 Department of Defense Chief Information Officer. (2003). Department of defense net-centric data strategy. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/org/cio/doc/Net-Centric-Data-Strategy-2003-05-092.pdf 
142 The technical software and connectivity details of instituting net-centricity are outside the scope of this 
project. 
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that still exist today, causing people to not share valuable information.TP143PT  The Chief 
Information Officer plans on instituting the following mitigation measures to reduce the 
resistance to data sharingTP144PT: 
• Use awareness campaigns and incentives 
• Ensure organizational and leadership awareness of net-centricity, data 
posting, and sharing 
• Commit to data posting and sharing by incorporating approaches to 
processes and procedures 
The unique security concerns of DOD also pose some issues for implementing a 
net-centric environment.TP145PT  If certain information ended up in the wrong hands, it could 
be detrimental to DOD conducting its business.  The Chief Information Officer plans to 
implement security structures that make data visible and accessible to the appropriate 
users by:TP146PT 
• Coordinating with Information Assurance activities 
• Ensuring inclusion of security classification for data 
• Providing a strong management infrastructure that identifies users to 
enforce security, roles, accesses, author identification, and audit trails 
Another area of concern is the quality and accuracy of the data that is entered into 
the system.  The Chief Information Officer believes that quality and accuracy will be a 
by-product of the net-centric environment because the data will be widely visible to 
multiple people at multiple levels.TP147PT  This may be the case; however, data quality and 
accuracy should be monitored to ensure that users of this net-centric environment are 




                                                 
143 Net-Centric Data Strategy 
144 Net-Centric Data Strategy 
145 Walker, R. L., & Olney, D. S. (2004). Net-centricity has many moving parts. Government Computer News, 
23(25). Retrieved October 21, 2005, from Hhttp://www.gcn.com/23_25/news/27085-1.htmlH 
146 Net-Centric Data Strategy 
147 Net-Centric Data Strategy 
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5. Summary 
BMMP has not yet included net-centricity of business systems as a requirement, 
but plans to include it in future versions of the BEA.148  The introduction of modern 
business systems with greater capabilities is meaningless if these new systems cannot be 
effectively integrated with existing systems.  Integrating the business data of DOD is 
necessary to provide decision makers with the most current, accurate, and reliable data 
available, so they can make the most informed, timely decisions.   
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Four key areas for future business systems modernization efforts were recognized 
through our case study research effort.  The four areas involve improving change 
management, understanding the implications of using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
products in business systems, structuring the acquisition in terms of well-defined, flexible 
requirements, and integrating new systems with existing legacy systems.   
Strong leadership is necessary to overcome the massive resistance to change 
present in DOD in order to reap the benefits of business systems modernization.  DOD 
and other federal agencies have been shaped by past experiences and traditions that help 
define their cultures.  The more deeply rooted their traditions are, the more resistance to 
change the organization will display.  Resisting change is a natural instinct.  People 
typically embrace what they are comfortable with and resist the unknown.  
Implementation of change is accomplished by unfreezing the old system, moving towards 
a new direction and refreezing the new attitudes and behaviors.  Change must be 
accomplished by a strong leader willing to champion the effort. 
Even though DOD is mandated to use commercial items to the maximum extent 
practicable, COTS is not the answer in all situations.  Proper use of COTS provides 
benefits such as high reliability, lower initial purchase costs, and vendor support services 
for the life of the product.  The potential downsides of COTS include short product life 
 
148 Business Management Modernization Program Website. Homepage. Retrieved October 20, 2005 from 
http://www.dod.mil/bmmp/faq_bea.html 
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cycles, early product releases that are rushed to market prematurely, and the lack of a 100 
percent solution for most DOD business system needs.  Our research identified seven best 
practices for COTS-based business systems.  Modifications to COTS products should be 
highly discouraged since modified COTS lose many of the benefits related to commercial 
items and help foster a sole source environment for systems maintenance and support.  
Configuration management is paramount when using COTS.  Systems must stay current 
by incorporating the latest upgrades in order to have continued vendor product support. 
Proper planning for the entire acquisition process is essential for business systems 
modernization efforts.  The process begins with well-defined requirements.  Generating 
well-defined requirements occurs when the users are continually involved in the process.  
Requirements also need to match the available resources.  These requirements should be 
flexible though to potentially allow for a COTS or commercial system solution.  
Tradeoffs between capabilities, system requirements, scheduling restraints, and cost 
restraints should be made throughout the system’s life cycle.   
System integration is crucial in all modernization efforts.  DOD does not have the 
resources to scrap all legacy systems and start over from scratch.  New systems must be 
effectively integrated with existing legacy systems in order for DOD to complete its 
mission.  BMMP has addressed the need for integration through the Business Enterprise 
Architecture (BEA).  The BEA defines business capabilities, rules, data standards, and 



























Our research has covered various issues relating to business systems 
modernization efforts within DOD.  Chapter II established the legislative backdrop that 
set the stage for the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP).  Chapter III 
looked at the current state of DOD business systems and highlights some of the problems 
and concerns that need to be addressed by future business systems.  Chapter IV is a 
collection of four case studies on DOD business systems in the areas of acquisition, 
contracting, financial management, and logistics.  Two systems, the Standard 
Procurement System (SPS) and the Defense Logistics Agency Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system, were implemented prior to BMMP.  The Defense Enterprise and 
Accounting Management System (DEAMS) and the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system were released under the guidance of BMMP.  
Chapter V presents our analysis and recommendations for improving future business 
systems modernization efforts.  Key findings include improving change management, 
understanding the implications of using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in 
business systems, structuring the acquisition in terms of well-defined, flexible 
requirements, and integrating new systems with existing legacy systems.  
 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
• What areas can DOD focus on to further improve future business systems 
modernization efforts? 
 
T he case studies on four DOD business systems deployed both before and after 
the implementation of the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) 
revealed four key areas that DOD can focus on to improve future business systems 
modernization efforts.  The first area for improvement concerns change management.  
Business systems modernization involves changes in DOD business processes as well as 
changes in systems hardware and software.  The second area of focus is the use of 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in DOD business systems.  While COTS 
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products have many benefits associated with them, acquisition strategies must recognize 
the potential downsides of COTS use and only use this strategy when appropriate.  The 
third area addresses the structure of the acquisition process.  Establishing system 
requirements is the most critical phase of the acquisition process.  Requirements must be 
well-defined, yet flexible due to the capabilities available in the marketplace and the 
amount of funding available for the program.  The fourth improvement area is 
integration.  No only does DOD need to modernize business systems, but they also need T 
Tto successfully integrate these new systems with existing business systems.   
 
• What is the current state of DOD business systems? 
 
Chapter III covers the current state of DOD business systems.  Legacy business 
systems suffer from increasing maintenance costs, making it difficult for DOD to invest 
in new systems versus maintaining existing systems.  There is a general lack of 
standardization among business systems, resulting in duplicative processes and systems 
unable to “talk” to one another and share information.  This leads to manual data inputs, 
increasing the likelihood of errors and inaccurate information.  DOD is striving to correct 
these issues and has had some success with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS) business systems initiatives. 
  
• What legislative acts instigated business systems reform? 
 
Chapter II discusses the evolution of business systems reform acts.  The initial 
push for business systems modernization started with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 
1990 (CFO Act).  The CFO Act calls for auditable financial statements from the federal 
government.  In order to comply with the CFO Act, financial systems must be upgraded, 
modernized, and have a higher level of standardization and integration.  The Federal 
Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 specifically addressed standardization 
and integration issues with financial systems.  The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 allowed 
for better management of information technology (IT), resulting in better investment 
decisions for new business systems.  The Business Management Modernization Program 
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(BMMP) was established in 2003 to provide oversight and establish guidelines for DOD 
business systems modernization efforts. 
 
• How successful has DOD been in previous business systems 
modernization efforts? 
 
Chapter IV covers two systems implemented prior to the establishment of the 
Business Management Modernization Program.  The Standard Procurement System 
(SPS) was launched in 1996 as the first DOD-wide business system.  SPS has incurred 
numerous schedule delays and implementation problems.  Use of a heavily-modified 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software package and a lack of well-defined system 
requirements have been the major sources of problems with the system.  The Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) business systems modernization has been much more successful 
than SPS.  DLA replaced two legacy systems with a web-based Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system.  The new system is providing better inventory management, 
increasing responsiveness to customer needs while lowering overall costs through lower 
inventory holding costs and long-term supplier relationships. 
 
• What new systems have been fielded after the advent of the Business 
Management Modernization Program? 
 
Chapter IV describes two new systems fielded after the advent of the Business 
Management Modernization Program.  The first program is the Defense Enterprise 
Accounting and Management System (DEAMS).  This joint initiative between U.S. 
Transportation Command, the U.S. Air Force, and DFAS is designed to be an all-in-one, 
paperless system that will handle and distribute all relevant accounting data in electronic 
form.  The second program is Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR).  This program will provide the acquisition community management of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information Systems through a 
unified web-based interface for information sharing.  Both systems, while recently 
implemented, appear to have incorporated the lessons learned from previous, less 
successful programs. 
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
• How has the broad definition of a commercial item in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) affected systems acquisition strategies? 
• How can DOD do a better job in the area of change management? 
• Will the nature of the commercial marketplace and increased reliance on 
commercial systems and services require a more responsive budgeting 
system than the current PPBES? 
• Has BMMP made net-centricity a requirement for purchasing business 
systems and has it achieved the desired integration? 
• What is the current status of DEAMS and DAMIR and have the systems 
achieved their goals? 
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